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Volume 13 WINTER 1965 Number 1
Ernst Fr�und and the New Age
of Legislation
By FRANCIS A. ALLEN
University Professor of Law
The University of Chicago
(This evaluation of Ernst Freund is excerpted from Professor
Allen's introduction to a new edition of Freund's Standards of
American Legislation, to be published by The University of Chi­
cago Press in March, 1965.)
Ernst Freund is one of the great and distinctive figures
in the history of American legal scholarship. The high
regard of his contemporaries is perhaps sufficiently sug­
gested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's tribute: "I don't
think I ever met anybody in the academic world who
more justly merited the characterization of a scholar and
a gentleman than did Ernst Freund."! A more particular
recognition of Freund's unique contribution was ex­
pressed by an English legal periodical at the time of his
death: "All [of Freund's] treatises have a very peculiar
quality of their own, unlike anything else in the whole
range of English and American legal literature. The
author's Teutonic education produced an inexhaustible
industry, a remarkable capacity for inventive classifica­
tion, and a power of subtle and penetrating analysis....
He stands out pre-eminently as 'a pioneer in scholarship,'
to quote the phrase used in the dedication to him of [a]
recently published volume.... "2
Perhaps the most persuasive demonstration of Freund's
quality may be found in the facts that, although his
major preoccupations were. in the most fluid and volatile
of legal subject matters-constitutional law, administra­
tive law, and legislation-and although his first major
work appeared sixty years ago," his writing still possesses
the power to stimulate thought and to illuminate con­
temporary issues. Undoubtedly there are many reasons
for the continuing relevance of his work. One of the
most important of these was Freund's willingness to re­
late his writing to a broad base of social theory which
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The Class of 1967
The opening paragraph of an article . written a year ago
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Freund and the New Age of Legislation-
Continued from page 1
was, in turn, the product of his remarkable erudition and
the wide range of his interests and sympathies. Unlike
many of the great legal scholars of his era, he did not
devote his life to the elaboration and rationalization of
particular areas of common-law adj udication. This is not
to say, of course, that Freund was indifferent to legal
issues possessing immediate utilitarian importance. A
glance at his bibliography reveals clearly enough that
Freund was interested in much that is of direct concern
to the practicing attorney. But it is significant that, with
one possible exception, none of Freund's major treatises
can be described as a practical guide to litigation or coun­
seling. His important study of The Police Power might
be so characterized. Freund himself is said to have mod­
estly intended the work as a "practitioner's handbook."?
but no modern reader is likely to accept this as an ade­
quate description. Freund's theoretical concerns are re­
vealed in his earliest published writings. In the preface
to his first volume, The Legal Nature of Corporations,
he wrote: "The subject of the following essay belongs to
a field of study and investigation that has been compara­
tively little cultivated in this country: the analysis and
nature of legal conceptions without immediate or exclu­
sive reference to practical questions.?" If Freund's influ­
ence with the bench and bar was less striking than that
of certain other legal scholars of his generation, it was
largely because of his refusal to devote his principal
attention to matters of immediate professional concern.
But the very depth and breadth of his interests contrib­
uted to the survival of his work and go far to explain its
present importance.
LIFE AND CAREER
Ernst Freund was born in New York on January 30,
1864, while his German parents were paying a brief visit
to the United States. His early education was almost
wholly German. He was a student at the Kreuzschule in
Dresden and the Gymnasium at Frankfort-am-Main,
and later attended the University of Berlin and the
University of Heidelberg. He received the degree of
J.UD. from the last-named institution in 1884. Shortly
thereafter Freund migrated to the United States, and
practiced law in New York City from 1886 until 1894.
He began his teaching career at Columbia College in
1892, when he joined the faculty as acting professor of
administrative law. He was granted a PhD. in political
science from Columbia in 1897. In 1931, the year before
his death, he received an honorary LL.D. from the Uni­
versity of Michigan.
In 1894, Freund began his thirty-eight years of asso­
ciation with the University of Chicago when he accepted
an appointment to the political science faculty of the new
university as instructor in Roman law and jurisprudence.
He quickly gained an enviable reputation as a teacher
and a scholar; and when, in 1902, the Law School of the
University of Chicago was established, Freund was ap­
pointed to the original faculty as professor of law. With­
in two years Freund had published The Police Power,
and in the three decades that followed he produced a
steady stream of articles, books, teaching materials, and
reports, including his best known writing: Cases on
Administrative Law (1911, 2d ed., 1928), The Standards
of American Legislation (1917), Administrative Powers
over Persons and Property (1928), and Legislative Regu­
lation (1932). In 1929, he was appointed the first John P.
Wilson Professor of Law. In 1916, he married Harriet
Walton. She and two adopted daughters survived his
sudden death on October 20, 1932.
Ernst Freund is remembered as more than a legal
scholar. For all his devotion to intellectual pursuits, his
life reveals an admirable amalgam of the active and the
contemplative. Being a practical legislative draftsman of
unusual skill, he was inevitably drawn into vigorous
campaigns for legislative law-reform. He played a prin­
cipal role in the drafting of the new charter for the City
of Chicago." In 1908, he was appointed by the governor
of Illinois to the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, a position he was to occupy until
his death almost a quarter of a century later." From 1915
to 1927, he was a member of the Conference's Committee
on Scope and Program, and contributed importantly to
decisions concerning the subjects to be undertaken for
uniform legislation. The Report of 1922, dealing exhaus­
tively with the policy and future program of the organi­
zation, was largely his," In addition, Freund formulated
many of the standards governing the drafting of uniform
legislation and personally prepared a substantial number
of the uniform acts. This drafting activity encompassed
an impressive range of subjects: marriage and divorce,
guardianship, child labor, narcotics, drugs, and many
more. But Freund was not content to play merely a
draftsman's role; he actively participated in the promo­
tion of legislative reform. His correspondence reveals
many instances of his involvement in law-reform efforts
throughout the country. He was especially prominent in
obtaining legislative acceptance of uniform legislation in
Illinois. At the time of his death, Illinois had adopted
fourteen of the uniform acts, all but one of which were
enacted while he was a member of the conference. In
anticipation of the convention which drafted the pro­
posed Illinois constitution of 1920, Freund was retained
as counsel by the City of Chicago. After a period of
research, drafting, and consultation, Freund formulated
provisions dealing with local government based on the
principle that Chicago should "possess for all municipal
purposes full and complete power of local self-govern­
ment and corporate action." The reaction to these pro-
4 The Law School Record Vol. 13, No.1
posals and Freund's skill in promoting them have been
described by a contemporary observer: "Instantly he be­
came the target of attacks. Men, spurred by sectional
feeling or political aims, assailed him as an impractical
visionary, derided him as a fanciful professor. Against
these attacks he arrayed fundamentals of government,
constitutional principles. He restated his views with
courteous deference but with learned authority. Toward
changes in phraseology he interposed no pedantic pride;
but, against any change that might be an impediment in
the path of progress, he was adamant. The force of his
intellect, the integrity of his character, and the charm of
his personality triumphed. The majority rallied to him.
His provisions, granting home rule to Chicago, were
adopted as proposed l'"
One of the prominent aspects of Freund's character
and personality was what writers of the past generation
sometimes described as a social conscience. He was moved
by the human problems of an industrial civilization, and
responded to movements for the amelioration of suffer­
ing and distress. To some extent these interests were
reflected in his scholarly production, as in his study of
illegitimacy laws commissioned by the Children's Bureau
of the United States Department of Labor.'? He main­
tained close contacts with persons engaged in Chicago's
welfare and social-work programs. He took an active role
in founding the School of Social Service Administration
at the University of Chicago in 1920. He was a member
of the first board of the Immigrant's Protective League
and continued his affiliation with the organization for
some twenty-five years, serving for a time as its president.
He drafted the act which established the Illinois State
Immigrants' Cornrnission.P In her memorial tribute to
him, Jane Addams said: "He never once failed to be
sensitive to injustice and preventable suffering."12 Har­
riet Vittum, another prominent social worker of the
period, described him as one of the most useful men in
Chicago."
Teaching was undoubtedly one of the central concerns
of Freund's life. He had strong views on the legal edu­
cation of his time, and (as will be discussed more fully in
later paragraphs) he sought to achieve certain reforms
in the methods and substance of American law teaching.
His former students recall Freund with affection and
respect, and many remember him as the great teacher
in their days at the University. A graphic picture of
Freund's methods in the classroom was sketched by one
of his students:
Yet his passionate eagerness and dynamic enthusiasm for his sub­
ject made these classes, particularly the one in Statutes, the intel­
lectual climax of each student's day. Not, however, that we
claimed at that time that we understood him fully. Or that he
made us content. On the contrary, we emerged from the class
in Statutes uncomfortable, confused and bewildered. Most of us
had spent more than two years in the orderly process of tracing
the intricate designs of the mosaic of judge-made law, carefully
laid down in the historical-approach casebooks of the period. But
Mr. Freund swept us from the German Civil Code to the English
Acts of Parliament, to the Statutes at Large of the Congress and
into. the myriad session laws and statute books of the several states,
where could be found for our guidance no rationalizations, in
written opinion or treatise. Worse still, we were placed in the
position of legislators or draftsmen facing prospectively a problem.
Policies had to be determined, the appropriate devices discovered
with which these policies could be best expressed and their admin­
istration and enforcement facilitated. It was our first contact with
the distressing uncertainties involved in the constructive formu­
lation of the law, our first attempt to cope with unanticipated diffi­
culties.P
The picture of Ernst Freund at leisure and in his social
contacts emerges with unusual clarity from the comments
of those who knew him. He was modest and unassuming
in manner, and managed his human relations with un­
failing courtesy and consideration. The range of his pri­
vate interests was exceptional. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
recalls his "exquisite appreciation for and pursuit of
music and painting and the arts generally."15 Another
interest is rather unexpectedly revealed in Standards of
American Legislation. Discussing the then recent legisla­
tive assaults on horse racing in the state of New York,
Freund observed: "It is understood that this drastic legis­
lation has effectually done away with the previous system
of legalized gambling, but that it has also been preju­
dicial if not fatal to the raising of thoroughbred horses
in the United States.Y'" Freund proved to be a poor
prophet, but one welcomes this evidence of his apprecia­
tion of good horse flesh. "The wide range of his reading
and his interest in human beings made him a delightful
member of any company. His unique talents made him
a leader in his profession and in the intellectual life of
the University. The integrity of his character and the
constancy of his affections made and kept for him a host
of friends."?"
THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD OF ERNST FREUND
The life of Ernst Freund spans the years between the
Civil War and the New Deal. In this period "the great
transformation" in American life occurred. "As if the
forces of change had been pent up for a century, a tor­
rent of events [came] pouring down on mankind.Y'"
Throughout the Western world, the forces of change
produced a new age of legislation. In the United States,
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1890 and its subsequent
amendments inaugurated an era of federal regulation
and established many of the characteristic features of
American administrative law. The Sherman Act was
only the most conspicuous of the numerous legislative
enactments directed against the trusts. In the decade be­
tween 1889 and 1899, for example, some seventy anti­
trust statutes were adopted in twenty-seven state and
federal jurisdictions.l" In the second decade of the twen­
tieth century, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade
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Commission began their careers. Factory legislation, laws
regulating the hours of labor and other aspects of the
labor contract, workman's compensation, public utility
regulation, and agitation for schemes of social insurance
-all became prominent features of American life at or
near the turn of the century. This remarkable outburst
of legislative innovation brought with it judicial reaction
and restraint. Cases like Lochner v. New- York20 and
Iucs v. So. Buffalo R. CO.21 were among the most widely
discussed public events of the day.
Throughout his professional life, Freund viewed these
occurrences with interest and concern. He brought to
his analysis an unmatched knowledge of comparable
legislative developments in the industrialized societies of
Western Europe. He was one of the first American schol­
ars to give detailed attention to the problems of achieving
efficient and effective government while preserving indi-
o vidual rights and volition in an age of widespread legis­
lative regulation. Freund was no uncritical admirer of
all that had been done in the name of legislative reform.
His underlying attitudes were expressed in a public lec­
ture delivered to the Bar Association of St. Louis in 1923.
"It is a different matter," he said, "when we consider a
deliberate course of legislation, which seems to represent
a national and world wide tendency. Not that we there­
fore need to consider it as wise or' perfect; but the pre­
sumption is that it responds to some demand of the time,
and that it is inevitable, and temporarily at least legit­
imate."22 And again: "Most of those who are beyond
middle life have been educated to regard neutrality with
reference to business as the orthodox and desirable atti·
tude of the state. The theory which that attitude reflects
was probably well suited to a period of profound eco­
nomic transformation which could have been directed by
law neither successfully nor intelligently. Now the lines
of that transformation have become tolerably clear, and
since one of the outstanding features of the new organi­
zation of business is the service of large numbers of per­
sons by particular concerns, standardization of methods
is almost inevitable, and it is perhaps equally inevitable
that this standardization should in the course of time
express itself in law. The tendency in other words seems
to be toward legislative regulation of economic activity."23
But if the main tendencies of modern legislation may be
regarded in some sense as inevitable, Freund did not
doubt that the form and impact of legislative regulation
could be significantly controlled and conditioned by de­
liberate and intelligent effort. Nor did he doubt that fail­
ure to take appropriate precautionary measures may re­
sult in the most serious consequences to vital social and
individual interests.
All Freund's major volumes are concerned with the
new problems created by legislative law-making. Indeed,
they may be viewed collectively as a single work, since
each of the volumes deals with particular aspects of the
larger theme. The Police Power, published by Freund
early in his career as a law professor, seeks to define the
constitutional scope and limits of legislative powers of
regulation. The first paragraph of his Preface exposes the
fundamental tension between freedom and restraint in­
herent in all regulative endeavors. The "police power,"
he says, should be defined as "meaning the power of
promoting the public welfare by restraining and regu­
lating the use of liberty and property.T" In Standards
of American Legislation and Legislative Regulation, the
latter published in the final year of his life, he turned
directly to the problems of law-making by legislatures
and undertook to identify the basic principles of sound
legislation and the distinctive techniques of statutory
law. But an age of legislation is almost inevitably an age
of administration, and Freund's pioneering works on
American administrative law are a natural expression of
his general concerns. Cases on Administrative Law,
which for more than two decades dominated American
law school instruction in the field,25 and Administrative
Powers over Persons and Property, perhaps Freund's best
known work, complete the list of his major productions.
Freund brought to his work a high intelligence and an
erudition that have rarely been matched in the history
of American legal scholarship. It was an erudition of
many dimensions. First, it should be noted that Freund
possessed unusual command of the various divisions of
Anglo-American law and that his knowledge encom­
passed the law in its historical as well as in its modern
manifestations. Freund's interests were by no means con­
fined to the public-law subjects. He wrote and taught in
the law of real property (including wills and future in­
terests). His articles range over such diverse areas as
domestic relations, corporations, torts, municipal cor­
porations, criminal law, jurisprudence, and international
law. Second, because of his German education and sub­
sequent studies, Freund possessed a thorough grasp of
the Continental legal systems. It is accurate to regard
Freund as one of the first and most important American
comparative-law scholars. His Administrative Powers
over Persons and Property bears the subtitle A Compara­
tive Survey; and readers of Standards of American Legis­
lation will be impressed by his skillful use of German,
French, and English legislative materials. Freund at no
time made a fetish of the comparative technique, but
employed it as a natural and necessary device for the
comprehensive consideration of the subjects he treated.
Finally, Freund's erudition encompassed more than law.
He earned a doctorate in political science, taught for a
decade in the political science departments of two uni­
versities, and in 1915 served as president of the American
Political Science Association. He read extensively in the
literature of sociology and economics, and possessed a
detailed knowledge of commercial practice. His interest
in legislation very early directed his attention to the re-
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lations of law and social science; and, although he dis­
trusted the enthusiastic movements for "integrating" law
and the social sciences that burgeoned in the later years
of his life, his comments on the contributions of the
social sciences to law-making and legal scholarship are
still entitled to respectful consideration."
Standards of American Legislation provides an ad­
mirable introduction to Freund's work and thought.
Written originally as a series of lectures for delivery at
Johns Hopkins University in 1915, it is the most graceful
and engaging of Freund's books. It should be read not
as a systematic treatise but as a collection of related
essays. Freund professed no great regard for the work,
and characteristically described it as a series of impres­
sionistic notes." It in fact represents the reflections of a
mature scholar of great learning on a vital subject, and
it contains insights which retain their freshness and a
relevance even after the passage of a half-century. The
quality of the Standards was widely recognized when it
first appeared, and the book was awarded the James Barr
Ames Medal by the Harvard Law School. The present
volume presents the text of the work as it appeared in
the 1931 printing. The index has been considerably ex­
panded, and a "Summary of Contents" that accompanied
earlier printings has been omitted.
It is perhaps just to say that the Standards deals with
matters of "technical" interest, for it is concerned with
problems of social technique. But the matters are not
technical in any narrow or trivial sense of the term.
Freund is concerned with the new problems of law­
making confronting the industrialized democracies of
the Western world. These are the problems of effective
implementation of legislative policy within a framework
of values that accord high priority to individual rights
and individual freedom. He is primarily concerned with
the legislative product, and directs attention to the or­
ganization and procedures of legislatures only when such
matters bear directly on the form and substance of statu­
tory law. For the same reason he does not concern him­
self with such problems as apportionment and legisla­
tive representation, lobbying, or corruption. In this vol­
ume, he speaks primarily of principles and standards and
accordingly gives comparatively little detailed attention
to the intricacies of statutory drafting or interpretation.
The latter subjects were of concern to him, and one
interested in a fuller treatment of these matters may turn
to his treatise on Legislative Regulation.28 Needless to
say, the Standards does not attempt a comprehensive his­
tory of the development of social policy in the manner
of Dicey's classic work.f"
No serious examination of American legislation can
avoid discussion of the relations of legislative and j udi­
cial power. This was even more clearly true in Freund's
day than it is in ours. It is significant that the opening
paragraph of the Standards adverts to these problems.
He does not hide his conviction that many of the then
recent decisions invalidating legislative acts on constitu­
tional grounds were mistaken. Thus, Lochner v. New
York,30 in which the Supreme Court of the United States
struck down a state law limiting the working hours of
bakers, is succinctly branded a "judicial blunder.t'"! Re­
ferring to Ives v. So. Buffalo R. CO.,32 which invalidated
the New York workman's compensation act, Freund
says: "It is perhaps easier to criticize the decision of the
Court of Appeals of New York than to explain how the
highest court of the greatest state of the Union could
have possibly reached the conclusion it did by a unani­
mous vote."33 It is clear, also, that Freund believed that
the judicial doctrines of "liberty of contract," which
achieved sudden prominence at the turn of the century,
announced no defensible or intelligible principle of con­
stitutional law. As early as 1904, he had written: "It is
the merest commonplace that some restraint of liberty
of contract and business, some discrimination, is not
merely valid, but essential to the interests of society. Can
the fundamental law be satisfied with the proclamation
of rights of absolutely indeterminate content, directly
contrary to other recognized principles, or is not limita­
tion and definition of some sort absolutely essential to
an intelligible rule of law?"34 He sounds a similar note
in the Standards: "But then, from a legal standpoint, the
essential thing is not the right, but its qualification, and
an undefined claim to freedom of contract presents in
reality no justiciable issue."35 Speaking more generally,
he also remarks that "the theory of constitutional law as
found in the opinions interpreting due process of law
is perhaps the least satisfactory department of American
j urisprudence."?"
If Freund's position is not to be misapprehended, how­
ever, it should be clearly understood that although he
believed that many judicial applications of constitutional
standards were mistaken and much constitutional doc­
trine ill-conceived, he never challenged the legitimacy of
judicial review or doubted its necessity in the American
system. He does not call for the abandonment of the
doctrines of substantive due process in the areas of eco­
nomic regulation; and there is reason to believe that he
would have been disconcerted by the developments that
approach this result in the modern law of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Although he believed that "liberty" does
not provide a proper criterion for constitutional adj udi­
cation, he asserted the importance of judicial protection
against arbitrary legislative invasion of vested rights. At
several points in the Standards he protests the failure of
the courts to assume a more active role. "Indeed, there is
rather reason to fear that the courts will exercise the
guardianship committed to them with less confidence
and boldness than is desirable.T" For Freund, certain
kinds of legislative intervention were clearly iniquitous
and indefensible. He unreservedly condemns many of
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the state licensing laws which he saw as creating wholly
unjustifiable barriers to the entry of persons into pro­
ductive occupations." Freund's quarrels with the per­
formance of the courts of his day did not extend to the
"underlying philosophical concept" of the due process
clause: "[ I] t stands for the idea that it is not the mere
enactment of a statute in constitutional form that pro­
duces law, but the conformity of that enactment to those
essentials of order and justice which in our minds are in­
dispensable to the nature of law."40 He adds, however:
"Viewed in the light of history, these essentials are
few ..."41
But Freund went further. He saw in the "liberty of
contract" cases, which he freely criticized, evidence of
legislative as well as judicial failure. "It would be untrue
to say," he wrote in 1904, "that all of the legislation that
has been declared unconstitutional has been vicious or
oppressive, and none of it has been absolutely arbitrary
or unreasonable; but most of it has been of doubtful wis­
dom or expediency, and probably all of it has inflicted or
threatened to inflict serious injury on legitimate interests.
And it is probably true that, in a great majority of cases,
those interests received their first hearings under forms
giving some assurance of impartial and adequate con­
sideration in the courts of justice.":" The same point is
elaborated in the Standards: "A statute enacted at the
request of labor interests generally seeks to redress some
injustice or grievance, but very often the practice which
employers are forbidden to continue has some element of
justification in the shortcomings of labor; and a mere
one-sided prohibition without corresponding readjust­
ments leaves the relations defective, with the balance of
inconvenience merely shifted from one side to the other.
Under such circumstances the courts are much inclined
to assent to the claim that there has been an arbitrary
interference with liberty or a violation of due process,
and there is a sufficient falling short of sound principles
of legislation to make adverse judicial decisions intelli­
gible."43
Freund's comments on the relations of legislative and
judicial power lead naturally to the primary theme of the
Standards: the search for adequate principles to guide
modern legislative law-making. As has been observed, he
regarded the judicial function as vital and could assert
that "our main reliance for the perpetuation of ideals of
individual liberty must be in the continued exercise of
the judicial prerogative.t" But equally important is
Freund's strongly expressed conviction that constitution­
al law is incapable of serving as an adequate source of
legislative principles. This theme recurs throughout
Freund's major works. It seems not too much to say that
one of his principal scholarly objectives was the freeing
of American public law from what he conceived to be
the crippling dominance of constitutional law." Freund
identifies a number of considerations which, in his view,
render constitutional law an insufficient guide for
modern legislation. In one of his articles, he argues that
the adversary process in constitutional litigation is in­
capable of unearthing the range of facts required for
sound judgments on the wisdom of legislative meas­
ures." At other times, he emphasizes the inevitable
vagueness of constitutional standards. Even when the
legislation under attack suffers from serious deficiencies,
judicial condemnations expressed in the language of due
process or liberty of contract rarely expose the vice with
necessary precision." Of perhaps particular relevance to
the modern reader is his argument that because consti­
tutional adjudication is primarily concerned with the
limits of power, it provides poor guidance for the wise
uses of conceded power. Reliance on constitutional stand­
ards may therefore result in lesser rather than greater
protections of individual rights. "[T]he extreme of
power tends to become the norm of legislation. For un­
fortunately the only utterances upon the constitutional
justice of legislation that carry any authority are those
from the courts; from this lawyers are likely to conclude
that there are no non-judicial principles applicable to
constitutional rights; and legislators (many of whom are
lawyers) seem to believe that the principles enforced by
the courts are the true and only principles of legisla­
tion.?" On another occasion, he wrote: "[W]e have be­
come so accustomed to rely upon written constitutions
for legislative restraint, that we have lost to a consider­
able degree the habit of voluntary restraint which is
politically so much more valuable.T'" We are in danger
of "confusing what is sustainable with what is right.?"
These points have been made frequently since Freund
wrote, and undoubtedly had been expressed before; but
they have rarely been made as effectively.
Freund's search for standards of legislation leads him,
naturally enough, to a consideration of the common law
and the processes of common-law adjudication. He recog­
nizes that the common law is a system of principle and,
as such, gains allegiance and acquires legitimacy." Clear­
ly, however, the system of judge-made law is insufficient
to satisfy the requirements of the modern era. Most of
the reasons adduced by Freund to support this conclusion
are familiar and need not be canvassed here. His final
point is arresting, however, and deserves attention.
"[T]he spirit of the common law," he writes, "was too
neutral for an effective offensive against practices inju­
rious to the weaker elements of society."52 In an earlier
paragraph he had developed the same point with per­
haps unconscious irony: "When interests are litigated in
particular cases, they not only appear as scattered and
isolated interests, but their social incidence is obscured by
the adventitious personal factor which colors every con­
troversy. If policy means the conscious favoring of social
above particular interests, the common law must be
charged with having too much justice and too little
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policy. It has fallen to the task of modern legislation to
redress the balance."53 Freund's general point is a valid
and important one: the kind of law that is made depends
significantly on the kind of law-making agency that is
employed. The courts are well adapted to weigh the
competing claims of individual litigants; but they are
poorly equipped to resolve broad issues of policy involv­
ing, for example, the reallocation of resources among
large social groups or classes. Judicial law-making in the
latter areas is confronted by a dual peril: it may ignore
considerations relevant to intelligent policy formulation,
or, in taking them into account, it �ay inspire doubts
about the integrity of the judicial process. Freund, writ­
ing half a century ago, saw the first as the primary
danger. Recent developments in our public law illustrate
that today the latter may also be a source of concern.
Ultimately, Freund concludes that valid principles of
legislation can be discovered only by a study of legisla­
tion itself; and he visualizes a science of jurisprudence
which would make the statutory law the object of in­
tensive analysis and historical investigation. "It is indeed
from the combined legislative, administrative, and judi­
cial experiences that we gather the problems of legisla­
tion and their solution, but the solution does not proceed
from or rest upon judicial authority, but must be worked
out upon the basis of a discipline hardly recognized either
in England or in this country-an independent science of
jurisprudence.T" For Freund, principle in legislative law­
making is essential not only to its effectiveness but its
very legitimacy. "So long as legislation claims to produce
law it must also strive to realize in its product that con­
formity to principle from which law derives its main
sanction and authority.t''" But what precisely is meant by
"principle" in legislation? Freund concedes the difficul­
ties of meaningful and comprehensive definition. In an
earlier essay, he wrote: "By principle I understand the
permanent and non-partisan policy of justice in legisla­
tion, the observance of the limits of the attainable, the
due proportion of means to ends, and moderation in the
exercise of powers which by long experience has been
shown to be wise and prudent, though it may be tem­
porarily inconvenient or disappointing in the production
of immediate results."?" In the Standards he says: "[I]n
any event it is something that in the long run will tend
to enforce itself by reason of its inherent fitness, or, if
ignored, will produce irritation, disturbance, and failure
of policy. It cannot, in other words, be violated with im­
punity, which does not mean that it cannot be or never
is violated in fact."57 Finally, he confesses: "We can hard­
ly say more to begin with than that it means a settled
point of view, and any closer analysis requires careful
differcutiation.t''"
Freund, unlike many enthusiasts for legislative reform
both in his day and in our own, was acutely conscious of
the "limits of the attainable" in legislative law-making.
He recognized that there are certain regularities in hu­
man behavior, certain conditioning factors in the tradi­
tions, habits, and values of a people, which can be
ignored by the law-maker only at his peril. Freund was
never tempted to believe that water can be induced to
run uphill by an act of Congress. "That the fight is won
in the courts settles nothing if the principle is unsound.
The courts tells us that valuable interests may be sacri­
ficed to conjectural apprehensions, but the practical needs
of the community reject and finally overthrow the con­
clusion.t'P'' So also, a criminal statute that does not ade­
quately define the scope of liability "is not only unjust
to the defendant, but disadvantageous to the prosecuting
government, not only because it will make convictions
difficult, but because it will diminish the vigor and con­
fidence of official enforcernent.T'? Certainly, the begin­
ning of wisdom in legislative law-making is to acquire
an adequate factual basis for action. "[T]he determining
factor in justifying legislation is that both defect and
remedy have some basis of evidence and have ceased to
be a matter of more surmise and allegation.T" He
thought it possible that "[t]he time may come when
courts will be justified in demanding that the legislature
shall act only upon some evidence somewhere placed on
record." But, he adds, "that time has hardly yet
arrived."62 Indeed, the absence of appropriate concern
for the facts is one of the characteristic and deplorable
aspects of legislative practice. "The student of the history
of legislation has constant occasion to wonder, not merely
at the absence of impartial and authoritative statements
of facts and conclusions, but at the entire failure on the
part of those demanding legislative interference to make
an impressive or plausible, or, for that matter, any kind
of a presentation of their case."63 Even with the most
conscientious effort, legislation, like all other forms of
social action, runs the risks of unanticipated conse­
quences. "It is also necessary to have a proper apprecia­
tion of the unintended reactions of the proposed legisla­
tion resulting either from its normal operation . . . or
from the conditions of enforcement ... or from attempts
at lawful evasion ... or from illegal evasion ..."64 On
the whole, Freund was profoundly skeptical of the capac­
ity of legislation to effect sudden and significant altera­
tions in the structure of society. "[G ]enerally speaking,
the function of legislation [is] to remedy grievances and
correct abuses, and not to reconstruct society de novo or
to force standards for which the community is not pre­
pared."65
The foregoing discussion, whatever its general interest,
leaves Freund the task of identifying and analyzing par­
ticular principles of legislation. No attempt is made in
the Standards to present a comprehensive canvass of such
principles. Instead, Freund is content to offer illustrations
of the kinds of considerations that might be made the
objects of more systematic elaboration in the science of
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jurisprudence he visualized. He first presents a series of
random examples. Thus, from the history of criminal en­
forcement of the Sherman Act he deduces the proposition
that "penal legislation ought to avoid .elastic prohibitions
where the difference between the exercise of a valuable
right and the commission of a proposed criminal offense
is entirely one of degree and effect."66 But the larger part
of his analysis concerns two much more comprehensive
concepts: the principles of correlation and of standardi­
zation.
By correlation, Freund means the interdependence of
rights and obligations. "In so far as it is recognized it
compels the legislator to examine a relation, if the term
may be used, from the debit as well as the credit side, and
it works against the assertion of absolute and unqualified
right.'?" It is the failure "to perform the difficult task of
adequately surveying and covering the entire aggregate
of rights and obligations involved in new legislation
which accounts for much of the alleged unreasonableness
of modern statutes, and has been particularly conspicuous
in labor legislation."68 Thus, can the state without the
sacrifice of justice require an employer to institute a hir­
ing policy that does not discriminate against union labor
without protecting him from the abuses of union power?
Or (to use an example much discussed in Freund's cen­
tennial year) may the community impose penalties on
the citizen who fails to come to the aid of one being
made a victim of crime without offering compensation
to the citizen or his family in the event that the required
intervention results in injury or death? It will be clear to
the reader, as it was to Freund, that the principle of
correlation is impossible of complete realization. The
ramifications of legislative regulation are so numerous
and pervasive that no effort or foresight on the part of
legislators can assure a perfect balancing of privileges
and obligations. "The claim," says Freund, "is not that
legislation shall be perfect, but that it shall approximate
perfection so far as actual conditions will permit. Only
to this extent is the principle of correlation contended for.
It is easily demonstrated that much legislation falls short
even of the attainable standard.'?"
The principle of standardization is Freund's second
major concept. "If correlation means more carefully
measured justice, standardization serves to advance the
other main objects of the law, namely, certainty, objectiv­
ity, stability, and uniformity.Y" Whatever improvements
may have occurred in legislative practice during the past
half-century, sheer caprice and inconsistency still charac­
terize much of American legislation. In Freund's view,
these failures threaten the legitimacy of statutory law.
"Permanence and uniformity are in themselves elements
of strength ... Conversely, lack of standardization must
weaken the authority of statutes."?' Modern illustrations
of Freund's position come readily to mind. It was dis­
covered, for example, that the criminal statutes operative
in Illinois before the enactment of the Criminal Code of
196172 employed more than a dozen different terms to
describe the mental elements of the various crimes de­
fined. The difficulty was that the legislature had used
some fifteen or sixteen undefined statutory terms to ex­
press not more than five or six distinct ideas. The wholly
avoidable confusion that resulted advanced neither the
interests of the state nor those of the individual citizen.
But the problem encompasses more than the capricious
use of language. Certain features of regulatory legisla­
tion, such as those relating to enforcement and adminis­
tration, present common problems and, in Freund's view,
should be made to express a consistent policy. "If policies
regarding subsidiary clauses are determined anew for
each measure as a mere matter of habit or as a conse­
quence of the absence of a general rule, it means for the
legislature the waste and wear of responsibility for new
decisions, for the administration the inefficiency which
results from lack of consistent purpose, and for the indi­
vidual lack of uniformity and therefore something that
approaches the deprivation of the equal protection of the
law."73 No doubt, in some degree modern American
legislation reveals greater fidelity to the principle of
standardization than in the period in which Freund
wrote; and it is also probably true that further improve­
ments may be expected from the expanded operations of
such devices as the legislative reference bureau, of which
Freund was one of the earliest and most effective pro­
ponents. But Freund's discussion demonstrates that some
of the causes of the unfortunate "ad hocness" of our
statutory law reflect basic characteristics of American
legislative bodies. "The striking difference between legis­
lation abroad and in this country is that under every sys­
tem except the American the executive government has a
practical monopoly of the legislative initiative.l'I" This
extraordinary diffusion of legislative initiative among all
members of the legislature breeds irresponsibility and
resists standardization and uniformity where consistency
of practice is most desirable. But the privilege of legis­
lative initiative does much to enhance the power and
prestige of the individual legislator; and its speedy sur­
render is hardly to be anticipated.
Although the Standards is first and foremost an inves­
tigation into the nature of principle in legislation, it also
serves as a vehicle for a variety of Freund's reflections on
the problems of the modern world. These dicta remain
one of the principal attractions of the volume. Much of
Freund's thought was devoted to the complexities of pre­
serving individual freedom in the emerging welfare state.
He approached these problems with a strong initial bias
in favor of the basic freedoms of expression. In The
Police Power he had written: "[T]he constitutional guar­
anty of freedom of speech and press and assembly de­
mands the right to oppose all government and to argue
that the overthrow of government cannot be accorn-
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plished otherwise than by force; and the statutes referred
to, in so far as they deny these rights, should be con­
sidered unconstitutional.T" In the Standards he says:
"That immediate political advantage is so readily sacri­
ficed to the conviction that free expression of opinion is
in the long run more wholesome to the constitution of
the body politic is one of the most remarkable achieve­
ments of democracy and of education in public affairs."76
Although he was not unaware of certain illiberal tenden­
cies of his time, his confidence in the security of the
rights of free expression seems to have prevented his
foreseeing the continuing crisis of individual freedom
that first beset the United States and all Western civili­
zation in the years immediately following the First
World War. Perhaps more surprising was Freund's
failure to anticipate the complexity of the specifically
legal problems presented by certain kinds of civil liberties
litigation, particularly that involving charges of ob­
scenity. "The offense of lewdness and obscenity," he
wrote, ". . . is a matter of circumstance, spirit, and pur­
pose, but these are on the whole so well understood that
in the great majority of cases it is clear enough whether
acts or conditions fall under the criminal law."?" But if
some of Freund's particular comments on the civilliber­
ties have only limited application to modern problems,
much of his general analysis has greater relevance. One
of the preoccupations of American legislatures in the
present century has been the enactment of statutes that
define "political" crimes: offenses that adversely affect or
are believed to affect the security of the state. Since the
legislative objective is to frustrate subversive activity be­
fore it becomes an unmanageable threat to the govern­
ment, the statutes typically attempt to reach, through the
conspiracy concept or other devices, conduct that is not
immediately dangerous but which is believed to be poten­
tially dangerous." Although Freund's comments were
not specifically directed to legislation defining political
offenses, his remarks constitute an unusually effective
and succinct description of the problems in this area:
"[I]n the absence of scientific certainty it must be borne
in mind that the farther back from the point of imminent
danger the law draws the safety line of police regulation,
so much the greater is the possibility that legislative inter­
ference is unwarranted.Y" And again: "If free action is
as essential to the interests of the community as protec­
tion from harm, the remoteness or conjectural character
of the danger is in itself a strong argument against the
policy of legislative interference and, if liberty is held to
be a constitutional right, against its validity.Y?
It is apparent that Freund was fascinated by the para­
doxes of freedom in the modern world. Certainly, the
conditions of an industrialized society require police
power regulation, which is to say, the limitation of free­
dom. In this connection Freund delivers one of his best
known observations: "Living under free institutions we
submit to public regulation and control in ways that
would appear inconceivable to the spirit of oriental des­
potism; it is well known what deep-seated repugnance
and resistance of the native population to the invasion of
their domestic privacy and personal habits English health
officers in India have to overcome in order to enforce the
sanitary measures necessary to prevent the spread of in­
fectious or contagious disease.T" Even the notion of free­
dom from regulation "has become unmeaning in so far
as adequate freedom in the sense of free scope of en­
deavor and of action demands regulation in support of
it."82
But Freund also identifies another range of problems:
those encompassed by the paradox: that there are certain
kinds of freedom peculiarly vulnerable to invasion by the
political agencies of a democratic community. "A strong
sense of civil liberty affords no guaranty of tolerance for
practices conceived to be immoral, especially where the
immorality bears on social as distinguished from business
and political relations; on the contrary, the enlightened
democratic community is apt to be more intolerant than
that which is despotically governed.t''" These problems
are still very much a part of American life, and, insofar
as their practical aspects are concerned, it is doubtful that
the modern polemics have advanced the discussion much
beyond the point at which Freund left it in the Standards.
Freund does not begin with a doctrinaire insistence that
there are areas of private morality that may under no
circumstances be invaded by legislative power. Instead,
he explores the American experience with sumptuary
legislation, particularly that involving liquor control and
gambling, and concludes that such attempts have in gen­
eral resulted in unfortunate consequences. "We may start
with the obvious observation," he says, "that not every
standard of conduct that is fit to be observed is also fit to
be enforced.T" And the discrepancies between the legal
norms and their enforcement are where many of the
difficulties arise. In The Police Power Freund observes:
"It [legislation for the protection of morals] is the tribute
which the organized community pays to virtue, and the
tribute is willingly paid so long as it involves nothing
more than the enactment of a sratute.?" And in the
Standards: "The formal declaration of policies is insisted
upon irrespective of whether they can be carried out faith­
fully or even with tolerable success; indeed, the advanced
policy is sometimes consented to only upon the tacit un­
derstanding that in actual administration it will be some­
what relaxed.T" It is perhaps here that a sound sense of
"the limits of the attainable" is particularly required.
"There is an obvious unwillingness to abandon abstract
moral standards once established, and the evil effects of
disharmony between legislation and administration is
not sufficiently appreciated.?" Freund's essential teach­
ing is that before legislative intervention in these areas
is sanctioned there should be a careful and dispassionate
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calculation of the costs involved. It is a message of as
great a relevancy today as it was in Freund's time and
one substantially ignored by the makers of American
legislation during the half-century since he wrote.
Freund's views on American legal scholarship and
American legal education require brief attention, because
they constituted an integral part of his thought and con­
tributed in some measure to his continuing influence.
The Law School of the University of Chicago was
opened on October 1, 1902. An agreement had been
reached with Harvard Law School for the loan of Pro­
fessor Joseph H. Beale, Jr., to serve as the first dean of
the new school. There is some evidence that President
Harper of the University of Chicago originally conceived
of the new school primarily as an institute for scholarly
research rather than as a school for the training of pro­
fessional practitioners. Freund resisted this concept, and
argued that the effectiveness of the new school depended
upon its being placed on a sound professional basisj'"
and his view of the matter ultimately prevailed. Never­
theless, only six months before the law school was sched­
uled to open, a letter from Dean James Barr Ames of
Harvard to President Harper protested Freund's views
of legal education and suggested that if they were to pre­
vail, Professor Beale ought not to undertake the tempo­
rary deanship at Chicago.89 "I understand it to be your
wish and purpose," wrote Dean Ames, "to establish at
your University a law school resembling as closely as
possible in its curriculum, methods of study, and quality
of its Faculty, the Harvard Law School." But a recent
conversation with Professor Freund had raised serious
doubts about the latter's commitment to these goals.
Dean Ames lists three principal areas of disagreement.
First, Freund had "suggested that 2/9 of the work lead­
ing to the degree should consist of subjects belonging
properly in the departments of Political Science or Soci­
ology." Second, Freund would admit non-lawyers to the
faculty to teach non-legal subjects, whereas the success at
Harvard was "due in no small degree to the solidarity of
our Faculty and to its concentration upon the work of
teaching the law pure and simple." Finally, Dean Ames
suspected that Freund's commitment to the case method
of instruction was something less than wholehearted.
Appropriate assurances were apparently provided, since
Professor Beale came to Chicago as dean of the Law
School and made an important contribution to the
School's establishment and early development.
Consideration of Dean Ames's concerns provides a
convenient device for examining Freund's views on legal
education. Sometime early in 1902, Freund prepared a
proposed three-year curriculum for the new school.P"
Some of the proposals were entirely conventional, but
others must have seemed at the time to involve startling
innovations. In the second and third years, the students
would have been required to elect five or six units from
among such course offerings as criminology, experi­
mental psychology, relation of state to industry, and
finance. It was this proposal which seems to have particu­
larly alarmed Dean Ames and Professor Beale. But per­
haps more significant was Freund's emphasis on the
public law subjects. He proposed instruction in constitu­
tional law and international law as part of the required
first-year curriculum and would have offered adminis­
trative law and federal jurisdiction among the second­
and third-year electives. Freund's proposed courses in
non-legal subject matter did not survive the opening of
the Law School, but his impact on the school's instruc­
tional program was, nevertheless, clear. Thus, the 1902
catalogue states the second objective of the school to be
the cultivation and encouragement of "the scientific study
of systematic and comparative jurisprudence, legal his­
tory, and principles of legislation." Administrative law
became an established feature of the curriculum, and
courses in international law were taught by members of
the University's political science faculty." In the years
that followed, Freund's own courses and the particular
emphasis of his interests strongly affected the character of
the institution. Indeed, the nature and extent of Freund's
influence led Mr. Justice Frankfurter to identify him as
"the father of the Law School.T"
There is no evidence that Freund at any time advo­
cated complete abandonment of the case method of in­
struction in the American law schools. In the Standards
he recognizes it as "a method superior to the German
system as a training for the future practitioner. ...
"93
But Dean Ames's suspicions that Freund entertained
reservations about the case method seem to have been
well founded. As early as 1915, Freund was quoted as
doubting the effectiveness of the method after about the
middle of the student's second year in law school." an
observation expressed by many modern teachers of law.
But more seriously, Freund was concerned about case
study as the exclusive mode of law school instruction,
because of its impact not only on legal education but on
legal scholarship as well. He regarded the influence of
the case method as being "as unfavorable as possible from
the legislative point of view; for the ideals of case law
will tend to be those of the system in which judge-made
law had its highest development ... and the case method
will foster the common-law attitude toward legislation,
looking upon it as an inferior product of the non-legal
mind to be tolerated and minimized in its effects."95
Freund made no secret of his dissatisfactions with the
state of legal scholarship in his time. In the Standards he
remarks: "Unfortunately, hardly any systematic thought
has been given to problems of jurisprudence in their con­
structive aspect ... In America the critical treatment of
technical legislative problems is ... meager and unsys­
tematic.T'" Freund must have suffered at times from the
loneliness of an intellectual pioneer; and he was probably
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expressing more than the natural resentment of an author
for his critics when he confessed that he had never read
an understanding review of one of his books.?? There is
evidence that he believed that legal scholars had not suf­
ficiently immersed themselves in the problems of social
policy and had failed to master the materials necessary
for sound policy judgments. At a meeting of the Associa­
tion of American Law Schools, he is reported to have
"compared the wanderings of the social scientist through
the trackless wilderness of fact and official action with
the smooth road of the law teacher, whose way was made
clear ... when he found the appropriate key number" in
the legal digests.98 It is apparent that the preoccupations
of legal scholarship have substantially changed since
Freund's day and, from Freund's point of view, for the
better. It would not be accurate to suggest that Freund's
influence was primarily responsible for these changes.
The logic of events made it inevitable that the law schools
could not forever confine therriselves to the elaboration
and rationalization of common-law doctrine, important
as that undertaking undoubtedly is. But Freund foresaw
the path that much modern legal scholarship would be
required to follow, and he is entitled to recognition for
his vision and his constructive example.
Standards of American Legislation remains after half
a century one of the most stimulating books ever to
come out of an American law school. It is not without
its weaknesses. One may justly complain, for example,
that much of Freund's discussion of legislative principle
is too general and too little related to particular areas of
legislative regulation to be wholly meaningful. On the
other hand, the need for general theory in at least certain
areas of legislative policy is clear and compelling. Penal
sanctions appended to regulatory statutes constitute one
of these areas, and Freund's argument for consistency of
policy in the interests of efficiency and individual rights
is highly persuasive." Much greater attention is given
to legislative materials in legal education today than for­
merly; but many of the difficulties confronting courses
in legislation that Freund identified remain largely un­
solved.l?" In short, the Standards does not solve all the
problems it exposes. "It is not for the student of ... law
to offer a solution for every problem in his field," Freund
wrote, "but he should help others to understand why
some problems are as yet unsolved.l'J'" Tested by
Freund's own criteria, the book must be judged an
impressive achievement.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WORKS
OF ERNST FREUND
BOOKS
The Legal Nature of Corporations. (The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1897).
The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights. (Cal­
laghan and Co., Chicago, 1904).
Cases on Administrative Law. (West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
1911. 2d ed., 1928).
Elements of Law. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1912).
Standards of American Legislation. (University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1917).
Illegitimacy Laws of the United States: Analysis and Index. (U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1919).
Illegitimacy Laws of the United States and Certain Foreign Na­
tions. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1919).
"Historical Survey" in Freund, Fletcher, Davies, Pound, Kurtz,
.
and Nagel, The Growth of American Administrative Law
(Thomas Law Book Co., St. Louis, 1923).
Administrative Powers over Persons and Property. (University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1928).
"Legal Aspects of Philanthropy" in Faris, ed., Intelligent Philan­
thropy. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1930).
Legislative Regulation: A Study of the Ways and Means of Writ­
ten Law. (The Commonwealth Fund, New York, 1932).
ARTICLES AND REPORTS
The Effect of the Norman Conquest on English Law, 1 Colum,
L.T. 232 (1888).
Contracts and Consideration in Roman Law, 2 Colum. L.T. 167
(1889) .
Historical Jurisprudence in Germany,S Pol. Sci. Q. 468 (1890).
The Study of Law in Germany, 1 Counsellor 131 (1892).
The Law of the Administration in America, 9 Pal. Sci. Q. 403
(1894).
Malice and Unlawful Interference, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 440 (1898).
The Control of Dependencies through Protectorates, 14 Pol. Sci.
Q. 19 (1899).
Government and Law in America, 34 Am. L. Rev. 16 (1900).
The New German Civil Code, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 627 (1900).
Jurisprudence and Legislation, Congress of Arts and Science, Vol.
7, p. 1, Universal Exposition, St. Louis (1904).
Constitutional Aspects of Employers' Liability Legislation, 19
Green Bag 83 (1907).
Jurisprudenz und Gesetzgebung, 1 Jahrbuch des offentlichen
Rechts 137 (1907).
The Problem of Intelligent Legislation, 4 Proceedings of Am. Pol.
Sci. Assoc. 69 (1907).
Some Legal Aspects of the Chicago Charter Act of 1907, 2 Ill.
L. Rev. 427 (1908).
A Proposed Uniform Marriage Law, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 548 (1911).
The Enforcement Provisions of the Sherman Law, 20 J. Pol.
Econ. 462 (1912).
Unifying Tendencies in American Legislation, 22 Yale L. J. 96
(1912) .
Report of the Standing Committee on Legislative Methods, Pro­
ceedings of the Am. Pol. Sci. Assoc., 1913-1914, p. 271.
Constitutional Aspects of Hour Legislation for Men, 4 Am. Lab.
Leg. Rev. 129 (1914).
The Problem of Adequate Legislative Powers under State Con­
stitutions, 5 Pub. of the Am. Academy of Pol. Sci. 98 (1914).
Supplemental Acts: A Chapter in Constitutional Construction, 8
Ill. L. Rev. 507 (1914).
Classification and Definition of Crimes,S J. Crim. L. 807 (1915).
Housing and the Police Power, 4 Housing Probs. in America 27
(1915).
Vol. 13, No.1 The University of Chicago Law School
The Substitution of Rule for Discretion in Public Law, 9 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 666 (1915).
Correlation of Work for Higher Degrees in Graduate Schools and
Law Schools, 11 Ill. L. Rev. 301 (1916).
Principles of Legislation, 10 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1 (1916).
Report of the Special Committee on Legislative Drafting: Provi­
sions for Licensing and Certification, 2 A.B.A. Jour. 454 (1916).
Constitutional and Legal Aspects of Health Insurance, 1917 Nat.
Conf. Soc. Work 553.
Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 207 (1917).
Prolegomena to a Science of Legisla tion, 13 III. L. Rev. 264 (1918).
Outlook for International Law, 15 New Repub, 80 (1918).
The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, 19 New Repub, 13 (1919).
Burning Heretics, 21 New Repub. 266 (1920).
The New German Constitution, 35 Pol. Sci. Q. 177 (1920).
Three Suggestions Concerning Future Interests, 33 Harv. L.
Rev. 526 (1920).
Abstract of Statutory Precedent Material Collected and Available
for a Manual of Legislative Drafting, 46 Rep. Am. Bar. Assoc.
417 (1921).
Freedom of Speech and Press, 25 New Repub, 344 (1921).
The Right to a Judicial Review in Rate Controversies, 27 W.Va.
L.Q. 207 (1921).
Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 Yale L.J. 437 (1921).
Memorandum on a Course on Statutes, 1 N.C.L. Rev. 104 (1922).
A Uniform Illegitimacy Law, 49 Survey 104 (1922).
Commission Powers and Public Utilities, 9 A.B.A. Jour. 285
(1923) .
Search and Seizure, 56 Chi. Leg. N. 211 (1924).
Administrative Law-Appeal from Administrative Decisions, 21
Ill. L. Rev. 371 (1926).
Deportation Legislation in the Sixty-ninth Congress, 1 Soc. Ser.
Rev. 46 (1927).
Administrative Law-Due Process in the Revocation of Licenses,
21 III. L. Rev. 493 (1927).
Administrative Law, 1 Ency. Soc. Sci. 452 (1929).
Some Inadequately Discussed Problems of the Law of City Plan­
ning and Zoning, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 135 (1929).
Supreme Court Holds Madame Schwimmer, Pacifist, Ineligible to
Naturalization, 7 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 157 (1929).
Operation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 727
(1930).
Responsabilite de l'Etat en Droit Interne (Memoires de L'Aca­
dernie Internationale de Droit Compare, 1932).
ARTICLES ABOUT ERNST FREUND
Note, 26 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1103 (1932).
Woodward, Ernst Freund, 19 The University Record 39 (January,
1933).
Addams, The Friend and Guide of Social Workers, 19 The Uni­
versity Record 43 (January, 1933).
Wormser, Legal Learning Dedicated to the Progress of Society,
19 The University Record 45 (January, 1933).
Kent, Ernst Freund (1864-1932)-Jurist and Social Scientist, 41
J. Pol. Econ. 145 (1933).
Kent, The Work of Ernst Freund in the Field of Legislation, 1
U. Chi. L. Rev. 94 (1933).
Van Heeke, Comment, Ernst Freund as a Teacher of Legislation,
1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 92 (1933).
Note, 49 Law Quarterly Review 177 (April, 1933).
Frankfurter, Some Observations on Supreme Court Litigation and
Legal Education (The Ernst Freund Lecture, The Law School,
University of Chicago, February 11, 1953).
Comment, Ernst Freund-Pioneer of Administrative Law, 29 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 755 (1962).
FOOTNOTES
1 Frankfurter, Some Observations on Supreme Court Litigation and
Legal Education 1 (The Ernst Freund Lecture, The Law School, Uni­
versity of Chicago, February 11, 1953).
2 Note, 49 Law Quarterly Review 177 (April, 1933).
3 Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights
(1904). Hereinafter cited as "Pol. P."
4 Van Heeke, "Ernst Freund as a Teacher of Legislation," 1. U. Chi.
L. Rev. 92 (1933).
5 Freund, The Legal Nature of Corporations 5 (1897). Freund was
not unaware that theoretical writing in the law was confronted by its
own particular perils, for he adds: "Such analysis is apt to lose itself in
metaphysical speculations and refined distinctions of little substantial
value: it has therefore fallen into some measure of disrepute even in
Germany, where legal science and abstract jurisprudence were for a
long time almost convertible terms."
6 See Freund, "Some Legal Aspects of the Chicago Charter Act of
1907," 2 Ill. L. Rev. 427 (1908).
7 The fullest account of Freund's activities in the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is to be found in Kent, "The
Work of Ernst Freund in the Field of Legislation," 1 U. Chi. L. Rev.
94 (1933). See also Kent, "Ernst Freund (1864-1932)-Jurist and So­
cial Scientist," 41 J. Pol. Econ. 145 (1933).
8 Handbook and Proceedings, Nat. Conf. Comm. U. L. 180 (1922).
9 Wormser, "Legal Learning Dedicated to the Progress of Society,"
19 The University Record 45, 47 (January, 1933).
10 Illegitimacy Laws of the United States (1919).
11 See Addams, "The Friend and Guide of Social Workers," 19 The
University Record 43,44 (1933); Woodward, "Ernst Freund," 19 The
University Record 39, 41 (1933).
12 Addams, op. cit. supra note 11, at 44.
13 Van Heeke, op. cit. supra note 4, at 92.
14 [d. at 93.
15 Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2.
16 Freund, Standards of American Legislation 88 (1917). Herein-
after cited as "S.A.L."
17 Woodward, op. cit. supra note II, at 42.
18 Polanyi, The Great Transformation 4 (Beacon ed. 1957).
19 Pol. P. at 331.
20198 U.S. 45 (1905).
21201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
22 Freund, "Historical Survey" in Growth of American Administra-
tive Law 40 (1923).
23 [d. at 20.
24 Pol. P. at iii.
25 See the perceptive Comment, "Ernst Freund-Pioneer of Adminis­
trative Law," 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 755 (1962).
26 See Kent, "Ernst Freund (1864-1932)-Jurist and Social Scien-
tist," 41 J. Pol. Econ. 145 (1933).
27 Van Heeke, op. cit. supra note 4, at 92.
28 Freund, Legislative Regulation (1932).
29 Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England (1905).
30 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
31 S.A.L. at 98.
32201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
33 S.A.L. at 110.
13
14 The Law School Record Vol. 13,No.}
a4 Freund, "Jurisprudence and Legislation" 9 (Vol. VII, Congress of
Arts and Sciences, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904).
35 S.A.L. at 3-4.
361d. at 220.
37 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Lincoln Federal Labor Union
v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
38 S.A.L. at 212.
391d. at 99-103.
40ld. at 207.
41 Ibid.
42 Freund, op. cit. supra note 34, at 9-10.
43 S.A.L. at 240-241.
441d. at 212-213.
45 One manifestation of this position was Freund's insistence that
the study of administrative law requires a focus on the administrative
process rather than on such constitutional problems as delegation and
separation of powers. See Comment, "Ernst Freund-Pioneer of Ad­
ministrative Law," 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 755 (1962).
46 Freund, op. cit. supra note 34, at 11-12.
47 S.A.L at 211-212, 220.
481d. at 284-285.
49 Freund, "The Problem of Intelligent Legislation," 4 Proceedings
of the American Political Science Association 69, 77-78 (1907).
50ld. at 78.
51 "Permanence and uniformity are in themselves elements of strength
and authority; and with all its defects the common law has never failed
to command that respect which belongs to a settled and consistent rule."
S.A.L. at 261.
521d. at 71.
531d. at 48.
541d. at 214.
551d. at 215.
56 Freund, op. cit. supra note 49 at 77.
57 S.A.L. at 218.
581d. at 216.
591d. at 94-95. See also Freund, Illegitimacy Laws of the United
States 56 (1919): "The practicability of such legitimation of the child
by the fiat of the law should be carefully scrutinized. The normal legal
relation between parent and child involves the social foundation of a
lawful or de facto marriage; without this, it is in fact a different rela­
tion-a fact which no dictate of legislation can alter."
60 S.A.L. at 225.
6lld. at 128.
621d. at 99.
631d. at 135.
641d. at 254.
651d. at 255.
661d. at 222. Freund had made the same point in his earlier work:
"It cannot be maintained that this principle is part of the general Ameri­
can constitutional law; but it seems to be in accordance with sound
legislative policy, that the exercise of a right intrinsically useful and in­
dispensable should not become criminal by overstepping a line which
the law refuses to define and which is not defined by custom." Pol. P.
at 25. See also Freund, "The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes," 30
Yale L.J. 437 (1921).
67 S.A.L. at 248.
681d. at 240.
69ld. at 246.
70ld. at 248.
711d. at 261.
72 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, §§ 1-1-35-1 (1962).
73 S.A.L. at 269.
74 u. at 288.
75 Pol. P. at 513.
76 S.A.L. at 16.
771d. at 78.
78 Allen, The Borderland of Criminal Justice 128 (1964).
79 S.A.L. at 83.
80 [d. at 84.
8lld. at 21. See also Pol. P. at 109.
82 Freund, op. cit. supra note 28, at 116-117.
83 Pol. P. at 172, n. 1.
84 S.A.L. at 106.
85 Pol. P. at 172, n. 1.
86 S.A.L. at 19-20.
87 [d. at 105.
88 Van Heeke, "Ernst Freund as a Teacher of Legislation," 1 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 92,93 (1933).
89 Letter from James B. Ames to William H. Harper, March 31, 1902,
Archives of the University of Chicago. See Comment, "Ernst Freund­
Pioneer of Administrative Law," 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 755, 763-770
(1962), where the letter is set out as well as a letter of similar tenor
from Professor Beale to President Harper, dated April 2, 1902.
90 Proposed Curriculum of Ernst Freund, Archives of the University
of Chicago.
91 Comment, "Ernst Freund-Pioneer of Administrative Law," 29
U. Chi. L. Rev. 755, 769 (1962).
92 Frankfurter, Some Observations on Supreme Court Litigation and
Legal Education 1 (The Ernst Freund Lecture, The Law School, Uni­
versity of Chicago, February 11, 1953).
93 S.A.L. at 311-312.
94 Van Heeke, op. cit. supra note 88, at 93.
95 S.A.L. at 312.
961d. at 251-252.
97 Van Heeke, op. cit. supra note 88, at 92.
981d. at 93-94.
99 S.A.L. at 270. See also Freund, Legislative Regulation 339-340
(1932).
100 S.A.L. at 314.
101 Freund, "Historical Survey" in Growth of American Administra­
tive Law 41 (1923).
Remember Spring?
Vol. 13, No.1 The University of Chicago Law School 15
"Fresh Breezes in the Windy City"
16 The Law School Record Vol. B,No. 1
Fresh Breezes In the Windy City
By KATHARINE KUH
(The article which follows is reprinted from the July 25, 1964
issue of the Saturday Review, with the kind permission of the
Review and of the author.)
This spring Chicago hit the jackpot twice with impres­
sive impact. First came the announcement that the New­
berry Library had purchased Louis Silver's peerless col­
lection of rare books, a formidable group designed to
augment and reinforce the already distinguished hold­
ings of that institution. Mr. Silver, a dynamic personality,
served on the board of the library until his recent death.
To visit the collection at his suburban home was an elec­
trifying experience, made more so by the presence of sev­
eral fine Rembrandt drawings and by Mr. Silver's own
contagious ebullience. If my blood pressure sometimes
shot up during these encounters, so always did my
spirits. Mr. Silver's name is remembered, too, at the
University of Chicago, from whose Law School he
graduated. There, in the recently completed Law Li­
brary, a room dedicated to the Louis Silver Special Book
Collection features rare legal volumes, some dating from
as early as the fifteenth century.
And it was in front of the handsome new law build­
ings designed by the late Eero Saarinen that Chicago hit
the jackpot a second time this season. On June 10, what
may well prove to be the city's most important modern
outdoor sculpture was dedicated. Conceived by Antoine
Pevsner, noted Russian constructivist artist who lived in
Paris from 1923 until his death in 1962, the soaring
bronze abstraction is named Construction in Space in the
Third and Fourth Dimension, a title which on first ac­
quaintance may seem unduly pretentious but which after
adequate study becomes entirely valid. For what happens
here is peculiarly related to the dimensions of space and
time. The sculpture, specifically planned to be seen from
all sides, changes as the observer varies his position, an
act requiring deliberation. To view it from a window in
the Law Library is a radically different experience from
approaching it at street level. Rarely has a sculpture been
more fully oriented to the multilateral possibilities of its
structure. It seems to unfold, to move not only in space
but in time with an almost hypnotic rhythm, and yet this
bronze is static, securely fastened to a magnificent granite
base (also designed by Pevsner). Convoluted free planes
are so interpenetrated with linear ribs as to suggest the
process of evolving growth.
Pevsner and his equally renowned younger brother,
Gabo, have proved that a sculpture can be mobile with­
out being a mobile. Never literal, never realistic, Pevsner
abstracted from both nature and contemporary life, his
proliferating forms reminiscent of immaculate industrial
machinery no less than intricate plant life.
In discussing the construction he gave to the univer-
sity, New Yorker Alex Hillman, a graduate of Chicago
forty years ago, has described it as "the conquest of a
poetic vision." Pevsner, he says, "liberated us from mass.
His sculpture affirms the architecture of Saarinen." And,
indeed, from the start Eero Saarinen advocated a work
by Pevsner for the 9O-by-120-foot reflecting pool in the
Law School's central court, a refreshing decision these
days when public sculpture in America focuses almost
obsessively on the massive figures of Henry Moore. This
is not to deplore such abundance, but constant repetition
can make even inspired work seem perfunctory. "Eero
felt that Pevsner belonged to our time," said the archi­
tect's widow, Aline Saarinen, at the dedication.
Saarinen's four buildings comprising the Law School
complex are joined by organic passageways that lead
without interruption from library to classrooms, from
offices to auditorium. Here an authentic environment has
been created, meaningful, useful, and vigorous. As Saari­
nen himself said, "The buildings were designed to func­
tion for the University of Chicago Law School and not
for anything else. The over-all concept seeks to reflect the
importance to the legal profession of both the written
and the spoken word." Hence the pivotal position and
dominating design of the library; hence the emphasis on
free meeting areas for open discussion.
Finished in 1960, the new law group adapts itself but
does not succumb to neighboring dormitories, which,
alas, are all too typical examples of banal collegiate
Gothic. The most dramatic single unit in the Saarinen
compound is the six-story glass-walled library and office
building, from whose multiple windows Pevsner's sculp­
ture appears to consummate advantage.
The university is fortunate in having two faculty
members who are at once authorities in their own field
and informed enthusiasts where art and architecture are
concerned. The moving spirit behind the new buildings
is Edward Levi, now provost of the university but until
recently dean of the Law School. It was he who backed
the entire project, assisted by his colleague, Walter Blum,
professor of law and a tax specialist. It is both rare and
reassuring to find legal scholars dedicated to such high
quality in the arts.
Near Saarinen's Law School, Edward Durrell Stone
has erected a Conference Center for Continuing Educa­
tion, a somewhat overelegant building that seems curi­
ously at odds with Chicago's exuberant vitality. Several
blocks west, a pure skeleton of steel heralds a disciplined
structure by Mies van der Rohe soon to accommodate the
Social Service Administration School. This is good news
and long overdue, for Chicago's greatest architect should
certainly not be overlooked by Chicago's greatest educa­
tional institution. There is also talk that a Fermi Memo­
rial may be designed by Nervi, an appropriate choice
since both men represent the pinnacle of Italian inven­
tion during our century.
That the campus could become overdiversified is a
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danger not to be dismissed, for too many unrelated de­
signers, no matter how able, can produce virtual anarchy.
Yet given a master plan and ample space, along with the
dedicated involvement of discerning faculty representa­
tion, the University of Chicago may in time physically
parallel the brilliance of its academic achievements.
Welcome
"A welcome addition to the periodical output of the
Law School."
With these words, Dean Phil C. Neal greeted the first
issue of the newest Law School publication, a quarterly
newspaper called The Reporter. And with the emergence
of The Reporter, the Law School has joined the ranks of
the many law schools throughout the country which
publish their own student newspapers.
Designed, in the words of its first editorial, both to
report the news of the School and to serve as a vehicle
for the expression of the ideas of its constituents, The
Reporter was conceived and brought to life by a group
of students led by Kenneth P. Norwick, who served as
editor-in-chief of the first issue. The first issue was pre­
pared during the Fall quarter, and published on Decem­
ber 4, 1964.
The eight page, glossily-printed maiden issue, which
featured a unique, blue-tinted view of the Law School
building as its nameplate, included comprehensive cover­
age of such Law School events as the School's Confer­
ence on Judicial Ethics, the Annual Federal Tax Confer­
ence, and the success of the School's National Moot
Court team, as well as feature articles on Professor
Dallin H. Oaks' experience as a State prosecutor last
summer, Professor Philip B. Kurland's recent scathing
criticism of the Supreme Court, the "Today" program's
visit to the Law School, and the athletic activities of the
law students, among many others.
"We tried to provide as complete a review of the
events of the School during the Fall quarter as possible,"
Norwick said, "while at the same time attempting to
bring before the Law School community ideas and ex­
periences that would probably otherwise go unnoticed.
And in future issues, while retaining these goals, we also
hope to serve as a 'crusading' or 'muckraking' influence
whenever necessary."
The Reporter's second issue, which will be published
late in the Winter quarter, will be under the combined
editorship of Judith A. Lonnquist, Warren P. Miller, and
Les Munson, who all served on the first issue. Among
other questions, the editors hope to explore, in this issue,
the bases upon which an entering class is selected, and
why the members of such a class chose to come to law
school and to this School in particular.
On Entering the Path of the Law
By THE HONORABLE HENRY J. FRIENDLY
Judge at the United States Court at Appeals
tor the Second Circuit
The Annual Lecture for Entering Students, delivered on October
5,1964.
The conventional way in which to start a talk of this sort
is to express the speaker's gratification at the inspiring
sight of hopefully bright young men and certainly attrac­
tive young women about to begin the study of law. I
shall commence somewhat differently-by voicing won­
der at your decision to devote yourselves to a subject of
whose nature you have not the faintest notion. If in your
few days here you have already learned to demand au­
thority for so brash a statement, I will respond, ad­
mittedly with less than perfect logic, that since those of
us who have been at the law all our lives don't know
what it is, there is at least a reasonable doubt whether
you do now.
A distinguished English scholar, Professor Herbert L.
A. Hart, has noted how in this respect law is "not paral­
leled in any other subject systematically studied as an
academic discipline." "No vast literature," he writes in
his book, The Concept of Law, "is dedicated to answer­
ing the question 'What is chemistry?' or 'What is medi­
cine?' . . . A few lines on the opening pages of an ele­
mentary text-book are all that the student of these sci­
ences is asked to consider; and the answers he is given
are of a very different kind from those tendered to the
student of law."
Surely, you must be saying to yourselves, this is no end
peculiar. Law is scarcely a new-comer on the world scene.
The Code of Hammurabi dates from the third millen­
nium B.C., and law existed long before. How then that no
one has ever taken the trouble to define it? What a
golden opportunity for the University of Chicago Law
School Class of 1967!
I must warn you against indulging in so seductive a
phantasy. Others have tried to define law; more than
that, they were quite sure they had succeeded. "In the
very definition of the term 'law'," wrote Cicero, some
years ago, "there inheres the idea and principle of choos­
ing what is just and true." St. Augustine put it more
crisply, "An unjust law is not a law." Hegel, in true
German fashion, put it more obscurely, "Right and ethics
and the actual world of justice and ethical life, are under­
stood through thought; through thoughts they are in­
vested with a rational form.... This form is law."
Well, you must now be saying, if this was good enough
for Cicero, and St. Augustine, 'and Hegel, why isn't it
good enough for us? Perhaps you will find it so. But the
team of Cicero, St. Augustine, and Hegel, which includes
many other players of repute, has by no means had the
field to itself. Take this as an example: "These dictates
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of Reason, men used to call by the name of Laws; but
improperly, for they are but Conclusions or Theorems
concerning what conduceth to the conservation and de­
fense of themselves; whereas Law, properly, is the word
of him that by right hath command over others." You
ought not need to be told that this cynical voice is that
of Thomas Hobbes. Two centuries later came the famous
statement that law was the command of the sovereign;
"The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit
another,"-Hobbes' concept in the 19th century dress
fashioned by John Austin. By the turn of the century
even more sceptical views came on the .stage. To John
Chipman Gray, one of the quartet of professors who
brought fame to the Harvard Law School, statutes­
what most people would think the archetype of a com­
mand of the sovereign-were only "sources of Law ...
not parts of the Law itself." The "law itself," said a
former great teacher at this school, Professor Karl Lew­
ellyn, consists of "What officials do about disputes." The
most famous of American judges had gone even further,
"The prophecies of what the courts will do ... are what
I mean by the law," Mr. Justice Holmes wrote in 1897.
Certainly that is an unhelpful definition for judges, who
apparently are obliged to do their work with mirrors; it
thus is not strange that they and others have thought
there must be some underlying stuff that enables the
prophets to prophesy and the judges to proceed from
prophecy to decision. Since this prophecy-enabling stuff
is more significant than the prophecies, why not call it
the law? If you think that fair enough, you must next
ask what that stuff is. What can it be other than statutes
and decisions and, for the interstices not filled by these,
concepts so abhorrent to the realists as justice and moral­
ity and social utility? Thus the realist quest devoured it­
self and ended where it began. Such, at least, was the
belief of another greatly admired judge: "A definition of
law which in effect denies the possibility of law since it
denies the possibility of rules of general operation," Judge
Cardozo wrote, in words that make sense to practicing
lawyers and judges, however they may seem to juris­
prudes, "must contain within itself the seeds of fallacy
and error.... Law and obedience to law are facts con­
firmed to us all in our experience of life. If the result of
a definition is to make them seem to be illusions, so much
the worse for the definition; we must enlarge it till it is
broad enough to answer to realities." And again, men
"go from birth to death, their action restrained at every
turn by the power of the state, and not once do they
turn to judges to mark the boundaries between right and
wrong. I am unable to withhold the name of law from
rules which exercise this compulsion over the fortunes
of mankind."
If at this point you are thinking of a transfer to some
other graduate faculty which at least has some idea what
it is teaching, resist the temptation! Although none of
the statements about the nature of law that I have been
quoting may be wholly true, none is wholly false. As
Professor Hart has also said, "understood in their con­
text, such statements are both illuminating and puzzling;
they are more like great exaggerations of some truths
about law unduly neglected, than cool definitions. They
throw a light which makes us see much in law that lay
hidden; but the light is so bright that it blinds us to the
remainder and so leaves us without a clear view of the
whole." Moreover, and this is another paradox, you can
have a rich and satisfying life in the law without resolv­
ing these great issues, although it will be a richer and
more satisfying life if you are always aware of them and
occasionally take time to ponder over them.
Let us descend to more mundane matters and consider
the work you will be doing these next three years, if I
have not unduly discouraged you. I remember with
horror the first day of our course on Property. We had a
case about wild animals, which the court, in an effort
to clothe them with proper legal dignity, called ferae
naturae. The opinion detailed the views of various Con­
tinental jurists. One, whom I remember after forty years
because of his intriguing name, was Pufendorf. Another
case set forth the views of a different civilian, whom I
recall only because his name resembled that of the famous
French chef who killed himself when the fish did not
arrive for the royal dinner-Vattel. Try as I would, I
could not retain in my memory what were the views of
the pompous sounding Pufendorf, and what were those
of the culinary reminding Vattel. With this seemingly
insurmountable hurdle confronting me on my very first
day, what chance was there to complete the course, much
less to prosper in the law? It was an enormous relief to
find-not, of course, by any direct word from the pro­
fessors, who were as mysterious then as now, but from
older students-that no one expected us to remember the
conclusions of these jurists, or even, although this was a
bit more desirable, what the New York Supreme Court
decided about wild foxes in Pierson u, Post, 3 Caines, 175
(1805). What we were to learn was not the law, but how
to "do law"-as today's philosophers say they "do philos­
ophy." If some substance rubbed off on us in the process,
so much the better; but that was not the main object of
the game.
Your efforts thus will be primarily directed not at
learning "law" but at acquiring a "legal mind"-more
accurately, since even twentieth century medicine has
not learned how to slip a new mind into the brain case,
at making your minds legal. What, you may ask, is a
legal mind? This is something easier to spot than to
define. Obviously Dean Neal has one-if he didn't, he
wouldn't be dean. I can testify on the basis of a year's
happy association with him as my law clerk that Profes­
sor Currie has one-although there were times when I
was not altogether sure he would return the compliment,
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Indeed, I would be willing to stipulate that all the mem­
bers of this faculty have legal minds, even if 'some of
them might think I was being unduly generous as re­
gards others. An official communication next summer
will give each of you a notion of the extent to which he
is acquiring one. Still it seems fair for you now to seek
more enlightenment as to what a legal mind is.
An easy out would be for me to take as an example
the standard charge to the jury in a criminal case that
reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, and to tell
you that a legal mind is a mind capable of handling legal
matters. But I can do a little better than that, and give
you some characteristics, if not a comprehensive defini­
tion. The legal mind is an inquiring mind. It does not
accept; it asks. Its favorite word is "why." Charles M.
Hough, one of the great judges of the Second Circuit,
wrote that "the legal mind must assign some reason in
order to decide anything with spiritual quiet." It is ana­
lytical; it picks a problem apart so that the components
can be seen and judged. It is selective; it rejects charac­
teristics that are not significant and focuses on those that
are. The legal mind learns to know that it does not
matter whether an accident takes place on a Monday or
a Tuesday, although some old cases indicated it might be
as well never to be injured on Sunday, but that it may
matter whether the cause of the accident is an auto­
mobile, an airplane, or an atomic explosion. It is a classi­
fying mind; it finds significant differences between cases
that superficially seem similar and significant similarities
between cases that at first seem different. It is a discrim­
inating mind; it has a profound disbelief in what Pro­
fessor Frankfurter used to call "the democracy of ideas."
Beyond this, Dean Levi's little book will tell you as much
as anything I know.
As you pursue this primary aim of making your minds
legal, you will be exposed to various branches of the
law, and they to you. Here again your adventure will be
quite different from your counterparts' in other graduate
schools. No medical school turns out a doctor whose
studies have included only the head, the throat and the
chest cavity but have wholly omitted the abdomen and the
bone structure-even though he will later have to spend
several more years in learning every cell of his chosen
organ. But the variety and complexity of mid-twentieth
century law, ranging through the alphabet from Admin­
istrative Law, Admiralty and Agency to Taxation and
Torts, and Wills and Workmen's Compensation, pro­
hibit anything approaching coverage, even in the most
superficial sense. If we classify the subjects of legal study
in a more functional way, the variety still is dazzling.
One branch deals with the demands of organized society
on the individual, in such diverse forms as taxation on
the one hand and criminal law on the other. Another
branch concerns the claims on and protection of the
individual against organized society; the social security
system is an example of the former, and many aspects of
constitutional law concern themselves with the latter.
Another covers the claims of one member of society
against another not otherwise known to him. Here the
great and always fascinating subject is the law of torts;
much of property law can also be fitted under this rubric.
Then there is the law governing various relations, most
of these voluntarily assumed, husband and wife, em­
ployer and employee, stockholder and corporation, an­
other never voluntary on one side and sometimes not
wholly so on the other, parent and child. Bordering these
are instances where the law enables people to enter into
transactions having legal significance although indiffer­
ent whether they do or not-the immense variety of
contracts, ranging from some of the relations I have
already mentioned through the great field of commercial
law to intercorporate transactions of almost unimaginable
complexity, and wills and trusts. Then come the newer
areas where government has imposed restrictions on the
freedom of transactions-antitrust law, public utility and
securities regulation, many facets of labor law. Other sub­
jects are concerned with the distribution of power among
organs of the same government or of different govern­
ments, a topic peculiarly important in our federal sys­
tem; these include portions of constitutional law, admin­
istrative law, federal jurisdiction, foreign relations law,
perhaps the conflict of laws. Finally there are the branch­
es which concern themselves with the manner in which
rights are invoked or duties imposed-civil and criminal
procedure and other portions of administrative law. You
will require, and receive, good guidance through this
wood, whose size and luxuriance I have only begun to
describe. When you complete your three years here, many
parts of the forest will necessarily remain untraveled;
but by that time you will have learned to find the paths
for yourselves.
If you want my views whether all this effort will be
worthwhile, I would answer with a resounding "Yes"­
and I say that as one who has been powerfully attracted
to another subject in his student days. My first, and best,
reason 1 shall borrow from a master of that discipline,
the historian Samuel E. Morison. "For my part," he
wrote, "I freely confess myself a historical hedonist; one
in whom the pursuit of pleasure overlaps the pleasure
of pursuit." So it is with the law-you will find the
sharpening of your mind, the learning and use of legal
analysis, the effort to put your thoughts into clear and
persuasive English, the exploration of the panorama of
legal subjects, as pleasurable as any such endeavor that I
know. A second reason is that the law is all encompass­
ing; nothing human is alien to it. There are so many
related subjects about which you ought to know some­
thing if you are truly to understand the law-subjects
which make law more meaningful and are made more
meaningful by it.
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First of all, history. Which of the wealth of apposite
quotations shall I use to make the point? I will pluck
from Holmes, not the familiar sentences from the open­
ing paragraph of "The Common Law" which you must
already know, or the epigram from his opinion in New
York Trust Co. v. Eisner, which you will learn, but a
combination of two others. "The rational study of law
is still to a large extent the study of history"; for "historic
continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a neces­
sity." Belief of that sort underlay Judge Learned Hand's
modest proposal that a judge called upon to pass on a
question of constitutional law should "have at least a
bowing acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with
Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante,
Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne
and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant....
"
Next, as Judge Hand's list itself indicated, I would put
philosophy, not so much for its forever changing content
as for its method. A Harvard graduate student asked me
last year, quite seriously and perhaps not without. basis,
how anyone could become a lawyer, much less a judge,
without understanding modern analytical philosophy,
particularly Wittgenstein; I have never so deeply valued
the privilege of silence conferred by the Fifth Amend­
ment. Many fields of law-trade regulation, labor law,
taxation, commercial law-can scarcely be comprehended
without some knowledge of economics, an interdiscipli­
nary development in which this School has pioneered.
Psychology has a role to play in evidence and in criminal
and family law. Other social sciences contribute to our
understanding of torts, of criminal law, and of land use
-and in the last we must work also with the artists and
the architects. We link arms with the political scientists
in exploring administrative and constitutional law. And
I am certain that the lawyer of the 1970's would do well
to know a good deal about the theory and practice of
computers, and the mathematics that underlies
this.
When you begin the practice of law, you will become
an interdisciplinarian in a different way. The office law­
yer who lacks knowledge of his client's business is a
poor adviser; the litigator who tries a case or argues an
appeal without adequate information as to the relevant
technologies is perpetrating a fraud on his client and is
failing in his duty to the court. The lawyer who tries
personal injury suits must have at least a "bowing ac­
quaintance" with medicine and with machines; one
specialist in airplane accident cases included a year as an
airline mechanic in his preparation. The patent lawyer
must know chemistry and engineering; the copyright
lawyer must be familiar with literature and music. Coun­
sel who appear before the Federal Communications Com­
mission must understand frequencies, and contours, and
coverage. Although the advocate before the Civil Aero­
nautics Board need not be able to fly an airplane, I
found it did no harm to know what makes them fly,
and a thorough understanding of airline economics was
essential. So, too, with the practitioners before the Inter­
state Commerce Commission, the Federal Power Com­
mission, the Atomic Energy Commission-ton-miles and
train-miles, kilowatts and B.T.U.'s, neutrons and mega­
tons, are their daily grist. Indeed, there is always the risk
that the lawyer will become so adept in his client's affairs
that financial and other inducements may lead him to
foresake his proper mistress. No wonder that when, dur­
ing World War II, it was found that the airmen engaged
in bombing and the scientists analyzing its results could
not communicate, the Air Force recruited lawyers as
interpreters, and that the colonel chosen to command the
first such group was a trial lawyer, now better known as
Mr. Justice Harlan. No wonder also that so large a
proportion of the lay leadership in such endeavors as
hospitals, education, and the care of the young and the old,
not to speak of politics, is furnished by lawyers. I know
that the extent of lawyers' participation in these efforts
is often attributed to motivations not completely altru­
istic. I neither deny this nor believe it requires defense,
so long as the lawyer gives honestly of his time and
brains. Few courses of conduct are wholly unselfish, and
if a lawyer thinks he may get business by helping put
a social agency on its feet rather than by lingering at
the nineteenth hole, the community is the gainer. The
ability, resulting from legal training, to come into an
unfamiliar area, quickly to grasp the essentials, then to
organize a solution, and finally to translate all this to
others, is what makes the lawyer so immensely valuable
in all these efforts; and his abhorrence of the vacuum
presented by an unsolved problem relentlessly sucks him
m.
You will thus, I am quite certain, find yourselves ab­
sorbed, both in your years of study and later, by the
fascinating game of the law. But you must resist the
temptation to think of it only as a game. To fall into
that trap is all too easy even-perhaps particularly-for
an appellate judge. The higher reaches of such subjects
as federal jurisdiction, the conflict of laws, and income
taxation have somewhat the quality of a chess tourna­
ment, and unless lawyers and judges and law-teachers
are constantly on the alert, the solutions may have about
as much relation to reality. Sometimes one has an im­
pulse to sweep the chessmen off the board and attempt
a fresh start. Often in dealing with such subjects, I am
reminded of Hermann Hesse's great novel, Das Glasper­
lenspiel, the "bead-game," translated under the rather
less descriptive title, "Magister Ludi." It tells how, after
a catastrophe that destroyed most of civilization, the
remnants were picked up in a central European country,
Castalia. There the elite of the youth were trained to
master the bead game, never described in detail but
combining the highest elements of music, art, mathe­
matics and drama-a sort of double acrostic raised to the
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nth power. To become a member of the order which
protected and performed the game was a high reward
for a young man; to become the master was the highest
of all. Yet the youth who reached this pinnacle came
ultimately to disillusionment and disaster. Such is the
fate of the lawyer who becomes unduly fascinated with
techniques and acrobatics.
Practitioners thus must always be on guard that they
do not become too completely absorbed in contests for
the benefit of clients, and judges must be wary of the
risks in the overarduous performance of bead games
for the applause of the law reviews. Weare engaged not
only in administering but in developing rules for the
conduct of society. If you do not like German symbolic
novels, even in excellent translation, the occasional read­
ing of a book about some foreign legal system or on juris­
prudence, even if you do not fully understand it, will
help keep your eye on the goal. When John W. Davis
said that lawyers "supply the lubrication" that makes it
possible for society to run, he was speaking the truth but
not the whole truth; you are not here simply to become
better wielders of oil cans. Dean Pound had it better
when he wrote that "Civilization involves the subjection
of force to reason, and the agency of this subjection is
law." Law is a process, not a result that has ever been
achieved for all time.
Professor Fuller has recently added another to the
many definitions of law. He says that it "is the enterprise
of subjecting human conduct to the government of
rules." Some may find, as I do, that this alone does not
take us far. But it is a start, and we can supplement it
with an analysis of the important differences in the na­
ture of legal rules-some of which I have already sug­
gested. There are the rules whose violation brings retri­
bution, whether criminal, "Thou shalt not kill," or civil,
"Thou shalt not slander." There are other rules the vio­
lation of which will have unpleasant consequences, but
only if one has previously so agreed, "Thou shalt not
breach a contract." There are the rules that enable men,
by following certain procedures, to impose their desires
on others perhaps yet unborn-wills, trusts, restrictive
covenants. There are what Professor Hart calls "rules of
recognition"-rules determining who can make rules and
how. There are rules that can be and are looked up in
law books before taking action-how many witnesses are
needed for a valid will, how to make an instrument ne­
gotiable, how to have a profit taxed at the lower rates
established for capital gains. There are other situations
where the rule is so vaguely stated that people often
cannot know whether particular conduct is within or
beyond it until a jury or a judge or an administrative
agency tells them-examples are the requirements that
an autoist drive with due care or that an employer bar­
gain in good faith. There are the rules made by the
legislature or its delegate, and those, decreasing in num-
ber, still left for the courts to evolve. And there are the
cases not governed by any rule yet ascertainable, where
the actors must simply guess, whether before or after
acting, what answer a court will provide, and the judges,
within some limits, can indulge in "the sovereign pre­
rogative of choice." Another contrast is between rules
that rarely change and those that constantly do-not by
the swift revolution that makes what was black today
white tomorrow but by the gradual evolution wherein
rules no longer suiting the demands of our society are
eroded until after a half century they are entirely gone
and new ones have taken their place. Products liability is
a sufficient example in our time. Then there is the fasci­
nating interaction wherein society having moulded the
law is then moulded by it-men today do not have to be
constantly reminded that they must not drive carelessly,
fail to perform bargained promises, or neglect to file an
income tax return; indeed, without this knowledge of the
general nature of the rules and broad acquiescence in
them, the legal machinery would break down.
The task you have set yourselves thus is not a small
one; it is nothing less than to learn, in the moving words
in which the degrees in law have long been conferred
at the Harvard commencement, to be "ready to aid in
the shaping and application of those wise restraints that
make men free." All of you can have some part in the
shaping, as well as in the application, if you will. Many
of you will become judges, legislators, law teachers and
writers. But for those who do not, there is still useful
law-shaping work to be done-as members of bar asso­
ciations or of political parties, or just as informed and
responsible citizens. You will have a responsibility for
what Professor Fuller calls the internal morality of law
-that it be clearly expressed, that it be applicable gen­
erally and without discrimination, that usually it be
prospective, and that it be known or at least be readily
knowable to the citizen. You will have a further respon­
sibility that the law should help to achieve the good
society. Fashion no longer requires that you look con­
descendingly on the utilitarian concept of the greatest
good for the greatest number or, despite Mr. Justice
Holmes' oft quoted cynical remark, that you take a con­
temptuous view of the age old idea of justice-a notion
that is still meaningful even if no one can define it with
preclSlon.
I hope that, in thus telling you of all that lies ahead,
I have not overburdened you with a sense of enormous
difficulty. Sursum cordal The prescription is really quite
simple. "What is wanted for success at the Bar," wrote
Lord Lyndhurst, "is a clear head, a good memory, strong
common sense, and an aptitude for analysis and arrange­
ment. Before these combined qualities, the difficulties of
the law vanish like the morning mist before the sun." As
you puzzle over the seeming contradictions carefully
planted in your case-books and the Delphic deliverances
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of your inscrutable instructors, perhaps it will cheer you
to recall those encouraging words of the Lord Chancellor,
to reflect on your own sterling qualities, and, if I may
slightly alter the title of a novel popular in my youth,
to remember that "the sun always rises."
A group of Law School alumni in Metropolitan Los Angeles,
who gathered to hear Dean Neal report on the state of the Law
School.
Iolani to Capitol Hill
The Record is pleased to note that Mrs. John Mink,
whom members of the Class of 1951 will remember as
Patsy Takemoto, has been elected to the United States
House of Representatives from the State of Hawaii. Mrs.
Mink had served for several years as a member of the
State Legislature.
Graduates of the Law School are occasionally beautiful
and frequently distinguished; we are seldom privileged
to point to one who is both.
The Appellate Court
The program of cooperation among the Courts, the Bar
and the School, described in detail in Professor Oaks'
article in the last issue of the Record, continued in the
Autumn Quarter of 1964. The Illinois Appellate Court,
the Honorable Robert English, '33, presiding, the Honor­
able John V. McCormick, JD'16, and the Honorable Jo­
seph J.'Drucker, heard two cases from its regular calen­
dar argued in the Kirkland Courtroom. Students in the
first year Tutorial Program were given research and
writing problems based on the cases being argued, then
studied the briefs, which were provided in advance, then
heard the oral arguments. Following the Court session,
counsel were kind enough to meet with the students at
some length, discuss their conceptions of the cases, and
answer student questions regarding their handling of the
Issues.
The Court-1964
The Supreme Court Review for 1964, edited by Professor
Philip B. Kurland, was published in mid-December. The
Review is dedicated to responsible criticism of the work of
the United States Supreme Court. Contents of the cur­
rent issue are:
"The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote­
One Vote, One Value"
by Carl A. Auerbach, Professor of Law; University
of Minnesota
"Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role
for Congress"
by Brainerd Currie, Professor of Law, Duke Univer­
sity
"United States t/, Barnett: { 'twas a Famous Victory'
"
by Sheldon Tefft, James Parker Hall Professor of
Law, The University of Chicago Law School
"The Sit-in Cases of 1964: 'But Answer Came There
None'"
by Monrad Paulsen, JD'42, Professor of Law, Co-
lumbia University
(
"Potential Competition under Section 7: The Supreme
Court's Crystal Ball"
by George E. Hale, JSD'40, and Rosemary D. Hale,
Lecturer in Economics, Lake Forest College
{{The New York Times Case: A Note on 'The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment'"
by Harry Kalven, Jr., Professor of Law, The Uni­
versity of Chicago Law School
"Act-of-State Doctrine Refined: The Sabbatino Case"
by Stanley D. Metzger, Professor of Law, George­
town University
"Flood Tide: Some Irrelevant History of the Admiralty"
by Jo Desha Lucas, Professor of Law, The Univer­
sity of Chicago Law School
A Goal Surpassed
The Eleventh Annual Fund Campaign set new records,
both as to the total amount contributed and as to the
number of alumni giving. The Campaign goal of $125,000
was exceeded by more than 6 per cent, with total gifts
aggregating $133,600. General Chairman J. Gordon
Henry, JD'41, and Special Gifts Chairman Arnold I.
Shure, JD'28, led more than 200 Fund workers in this
remarkable effort. It is interesting to note that some 79
gifts totalling more than $20,000 came from non-alumni
friends of the School.
Richard H. Levin, JD'37, has accepted the General
Chairmanship of the Twelfth Annual Fund; organiza­
tion for the Campaign is under way.
Vol. 13, No.1 The University of Chicago Law School
The Electrical Equipment Cases
A great flood of litigation, amounting to more than 1,800
cases, was loosed upon the Federal Courts as a result of
the electrical equipment price-fixing cases. In an effort to
expedite the handling of these cases, a coordinating com­
mittee was set up, with the cooperation of the courts and
counsel for both plaintiffs and defendants. Dean Phil C.
Neal is acting as Executive Secretary of that committee,
which has its headquarters in Chicago. (For a detailed
description of the work of the Committee, see Dean
Neal's article, with Perry Goldberg, JD'60, "The Electri­
cal Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial Adminis­
tration," 50 American Bar Association Journal 621
(1964) ). Early in October, a national meeting of those
concerned with the work of the Committee was held in
Chicago. The Law School was host to a reception and
dinner for the judges and lawyers involved. On the fol­
lowing day, hearings carrying forward the work of the
Committee were held in the Weymouth Kirkland Court­
room.
The Honorable Edwin Robson, u.s. District Judge, Northern
District of Illinois, and Mrs. Robson, at the Committee Reception.
The Honorable Alfred Murrah, Judge of the U.s. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit and Chairman of the Coordinating Com­
mittee, with Dean Phil C. Neal.
Gordon R. Close, President of the Chicago Bar Association,
Mrs. Close, and the Honorable A. L. Marovitz, U.S. District Judge,
Chicago.
George Stigler, Charles R. Walgreen Distinguished Service Pro­
fessor of American Institutions, was the featured speaker of the
evening.
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The Honorable Robert L. Hunter, JD'27, Judge of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, and Mrs. Hunter, with the Honorable John
v. McCormick, JD'16, Justice of the Illinois Appellate Court, and
Mrs. McCormick, at the reception for the Coordinating Committee.
Charles A. Bane, '37, of Isham, Lincoln and Beale, and the
Honorable Julius Hoffman, U.S. District Judge, Chicago.
The Honorable Wilfred Feinberg and Mrs. Feinberg at the Com­
mittee Reception.
Law Day Address
By THE HONORABLE ROBERT F. KENNEDY
United States Senator from New York
A Talk Delivered by Senator Kennedy, then Attorney General of the
United States, at the Law School on Law Day, May 1, 1964
Law Day is. a day which is set aside for all of us to re­
affirm our faith in a government of law. We lawyers can
celebrate it in two ways: by speeches which praise the
law and, by implication, ourselves; or by using it as an
occasion to examine the problems which face our society
and whose resolution should challenge us as. lawyers.
Tonight I wish to do the latter.
We meet here today at a great law school in the heart
of a great metropolitan center. In the area surrounding
this school there live thousands and tens of thousands of
people who are daily coping with-or failing to cope
with-the problems which beset an urban and industrial
society. In this area are problems of crime and delin­
quency, of education and over-crowded housing, and all
the other problems which accompany poverty.
This is not a unique area. These are not unique prob­
lems. They are the problems of an urban and industrial
society.
And because law does not exist in a vacuum, they are
the problems which law faces today in the United States.
I think the solution to these problems should be a chal­
lenge to all of us-and particularly to young people who
are now embarking upon professional careers. I am deep­
ly concerned over whether, as a profession dedicated to
the rule of law, we are meeting-or even seeing-the
challenge which the peculiar character of our urban soci­
ety is daily making. We concentrate too much on the
traditional stuff of the law-on lawsuits, courts, and for­
mal legal learning-too little upon the fundamental
changes in our society which may, in the final analysis,
do much more to determine the fate of law and of the
rule of law as we understand it.
No single set of experiences has brought this point
home to me more forcibly than the contacts I have had
with juvenile delinquency.
The Justice Department's traditional concern is with
law enforcement. But in coping with an ever mounting
trend in young offenders, law enforcement is a small part
of the total picture. In formulating our program on juve­
nile delinquency it quickly became clear to us that the
emphasis could be not upon law violations and law vio­
lators, but upon the causes of violation. To put it differ­
ently, youth offenses are not the illness to be dealt with.
They are merely symptoms of an illness that goes far
deeper in our society.
To arrive at this conclusion one need not be a sociolo­
gist, or a social worker or a planner. One simply needs to
walk the slums of Washington, or New York, or Chi-
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cago, or through the commumties of Appalachia, and
talk with the young people.
For many of these young people law violation is not
the isolated outburst of a social misfit. It is part of a way
of life where all conventional routes to success are
blocked and where law abidingness has lost all meaning
and appeal.
You cannot look into their eyes or look up and down
the asphalt jungle or the desolate hollows in which they
live without sensing the despair, the frustration, the futil­
ity and the alienation they feel. One is strongly impelled
to do something, to make some gesture that says: "People
do care; don't give up."
Surely the answer to this problem is not simply to pro­
vide more and better juvenile courts, more and better
juvenile institutions or more and better lawyers in the
process to prosecute or defend young people who then
return to the same desolation which caused their diffi­
culty in the first place.
What is needed are programs which deal directly with
the causes of delinquency. These are programs to impart
skills, to instill motivation, to create opportunity. These
are programs which urge young people to stay in school.
These are summer job programs for high school students.
These are programs to provide decent recreational facili­
ties.-These are, in short, programs which indicate that
all young people do count in this society.
The model programs developed through the Presi­
dent's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency all involve
expanding our concept of law enforcement-from detec­
tion, punishment and treatment-to prevention. We seek
to help communities build programs which deal not with
law violation but with eliminating its underlying causes.
The idea of social action programs rather than simply
, programs of law enforcement is not a new one. But it is
an idea which threatens to leave the lawyer behind-to
cut him adrift from day-to-day involvement with the
major social issues of our times. Let me tell you why.
The lawyer helps to frame the legislation for the pro­
grams dealing with these problems; he writes the grants
to agencies to carryon these programs. He preserves the
form, ignores the substance, and then he goes his way.
As a profession, we have conveniently-perhaps lazily
-abdicated responsibility for dealing with major social
problems to other professions-to sociologists, educators,
community organizers, social workers, psychologists.
Rarely, if ever, do the best lawyers and the best law
firms work with the legal problems that beset the most
deprived segments of our society. With some outstanding
exceptions, that work is done-if it is done at all-by the
members of the bar who have least prestige, who are like­
ly to be poorly trained and who are themselves engaged
in a struggle for economic survival.
There remain whole areas of the law where no more
than a handful of lawyers go to assist those most in need
of legal help. How often does one find the needy repre­
sented by counsel in dealing with social welfare agencies,
unemployment compensation review boards, or school
and welfare officials, finance companies, or slum land­
lords?
In the realm of criminal law we are now beginning to
fulfill our professional responsibility . To the indigent, we
are witnessing a series of steps toward fairer representa­
tion for those without funds. No small portion of the
credit is due to your own Professor Allen who headed
our committee which has made an excellent report on the
problems of the poor in obtaining equal justice in the
federal courts.
That report has spurred efforts on both the state and
federal level. To these efforts must be added full recogni­
tion of the monumental work of the legal profession.
Law schools have contributed much and should con­
tribute more. Legal aid societies, often staffed in part by
law students, have done extremely worthy work. This
University's program, sparked by Dean Levi, provides a
notable example of public service, community concern,
and intellectual inquiry.
But these efforts are in large part due. to the Supreme
Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainright) which made
representation by counsel mandatory in criminal pro­
ceedings. All these efforts notwithstanding, the funda­
mental question remains: Should there ever have been a
need for the Gideon decision? Did we need a Constitu­
tional determination to tell us our professional responsi­
bilities?
Lawyers could ask themselves similar questions about
other problems which are central to our society but which
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exist on the fringes of. the law. The social protest of the
American Negro is not, as such, a legal problem. But the
voluntary Lawyers' Committee for Equal Rights under
Law, for example, has generated the effective assistance of
many lawyers, normally devoted to more formal legal
pursuits, in the cause of civil rights.
There is a great need for America to live up to its
political promise of civil rights for all its citizens. But
there is a parallel need for America to live up to the
economic promise of social rights, of social-and thus
equal-justice under law.
The place to start is to ask ourselves what is our re­
sponsibility in dealing with those problems which stem
from poverty-from that phenomenon of massive priva­
tion to which our nation is now awakening and to which
our legal profession must now respond.
We, as a profession, have an obligation to enlist our
skills and ourselves in the unconditional war on poverty
to which President Johnson has summoned all of us.
And in asking where do we begin, we must first recog­
nize that poverty is not simply a condition of want.
In the final analysis, poverty is a condition of helpless­
ness-of inability to cope with the conditions of existence
in our complex society.
We know something about that helplessness. The in­
ability of a poor and uneducated person to defend him­
self unaided by counsel in a court of criminal justice is
both symbolic and symptomatic of his larger helplessness.
But we, as a profession, have backed away from deal­
ing with that larger helplessness. We have secured the
acquittal of an indigent person-but only to abandon him
to eviction notices, wage attachments, repossession of
goods and termination of welfare benefits.
To the poor man, "legal" has become a synonym
simply for technicalities and obstruction, not for that
which is to be respected.
The poor man looks upon the law as an enemy, not as
a friend. For him the law is always taking something
away.
It is time to recognize that lawyers have a very special
role to play in dealing with this helplessness. And it is
time we filled it.
Some of the necessary jobs are not very different from
what lawyers have been doing all along for government,
for business, for those who can pay and pay well. They
involve essentially the same skills. The problems are a
little more difficult. The fees are less. The rewards are
greater.
First, we have to make law less complex and more
workable. Lawyers have been paid, and paid well, to
proliferate subtleties and complexities. It is about time
we brought our intellectual resources to bear on eliminat­
ing some of those intricacies.
A wealthy client can pay counsel to unravel-or to
create-a complex tangle of questions concerning di-
vorce, conflict of laws and full faith and credit in order
to straighten out-or cast doubt upon-certain custody
and support obligations. It makes no kind of sense to
have to go through similarly complex legal mazes to de­
termine whether Mrs. Jones should have been denied so­
cial security or Aid to Dependent Children benefits. To
put a price tag on justice may be to deny it.
Second, we have to begin asserting rights which the
poor have always had in theory-but which they have
never been able to assert on their own behalf. Unasserted,
unknown, unavailable rights are no rights at all.
Lawyers must bear the responsibility for permitting
the growth and continuance of two systems of law-one
for the rich, one for the poor. Without a lawyer of what
use is the administrative review procedure set up under
various welfare programs? Without a lawyer of what
use is the right to a partial refund for the payments made
on a repossessed car?
What is the price tag of equal justice under law? Has
simple justice a price which we as a profession must
exact?
Helplessness does not stem from the absence of theo­
retical rights. It can stem from an inability to assert real
rights. The tenants of slums, and public housing projects,
the purchasers from disreputable finance companies, the
minority group member who is discriminated against­
all these may have legal rights which-if we are candid­
remain in the limbo of the law.
Third, we need to practice preventive law on behalf of
the poor. Just as the corporate lawyer tries to steer com­
pany policy away from the antitrust, fraud, or securities
laws, so too, the individual can be counselled about leases,
purchases and a variety of common arrangements where­
by he can be victimized and exploited.
Fourth, we need to begin to develop new kinds of legal
rights in situations that are not now perceived as involv­
ing legal issues. We live in a society that has a vast bu­
reaucracy charged with many responsibilities. When
those responsibilities are not properly discharged, it is
the poor and the helpless who are most likely to be hurt
and to have no remedy whatsoever.
We need to define those responsibilities and convert
them into legal obligations. We need to create new rem­
edies to deal with the multitude of daily injuries that
persons suffer in this complex society simply because it
is complex.
I am not talking about persons who injure others out
of selfish or evil motives. I am talking about the injuries
which result simply from administrative convenience, in­
juries which may be done inadvertently by those endeav­
oring to help-teachers and social workers and urban
planners.
These are not unusual tasks. Lawyers do them all the
time in every major field of law.
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The then Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, talks informally
with students.
It is time we used those traditional skills-our preci­
sion, our understanding of technicalities, our adversary
skills, our negotiating skills, our understanding of pro­
cedural maneuvers-on behalf of the poor.
Only when we have done all these things, when we
have created in fact a system of equal justice for all-a
system which recognizes in fact the dignity of all men­
will our profession have lived up to its responsibilities.
That job is not going to be done by simply writing a
check for $l00-or $1,OOO-to the legal aid society. These
are jobs that will take the combined commitments of our
intellectual, and ethical energies-a sustained commit­
ment-a pledge to donate not once or twice but continu­
ously the resources of our profession and our legal system.
Our professional mandate goes far beyond protecting
the presumption of innocence throughout a criminal
trial. Our obligation extends to championing a larger
presumption-the presumption of individual sanctity
and worth which must attend all-rich and poor alike­
if the rule of law is to prevail in reality as it does in Law
Day speeches.
These are obligations of the legal profession. But here
at this University they are peculiarly yours. That is so
because-whether you welcome it or not-graduating
from a great school puts an obligation squarely upon
you.
Last October, President Kennedy, visiting Amherst
College, said:
There is inherited wealth in this country and also inherited
poverty. And unless the graduates of this college and other col­
leges like it who are given a running start in life-unless they
are willing to put back into our society those talents, the broad
sympathy, the understanding, the compassion-unless they are
willing to put those qualities back into the service of the Great
Republic, then obviously the presuppositions upon which our
democracy are based are bound to be fallible.
An English Visitor's View of
the Law School
By GUENTHER TREITEL
Fellow of All Souls'; Lecturer in Law, Magdalen College; Visiting
Lecturer, The University of Chicago Law School, 1963-64
In giving my impressions of this Law School, the first
and most important thing I want to say is that my year
here has been a most exciting and enjoyable one. I attrib­
ute this mainly to three things. First, to the library, which
offers facilities far better than those of any single law
library now open in England.' Secondly, to the students
whom I have found lively, intelligent and pleasant to
teach. Thirdly, to the faculty: their kindness and patience
in innumerable discussions have done more than any­
thing to make this such a rewarding year for me, and I
should like to take this opportunity of thanking them.
My impressions of the Law School may be most inter­
esting to you at the points of contrast between this School
and Oxford. Of course one must bear in mind that this is
a graduate professional school, while at Oxford we teach
a law course to undergraduates which does not lead them
to, or even very near to, a professional qualification. This
may account for some of the differences between the two
places, such as differences in the curricula. But even so,
there are two differences between this School and Oxford
which are 50 striking that I should like to say something
about each of them. They are teaching methods and
examinations.
In Oxford the principal method of teaching is still the
individual tutorial. A student writes a weekly essay on
some quite broad topic. He then reads it out to his tutor
who criticizes it, discusses the topic generally, and tries
to answer any questions which the student may ask. We
also use the straight lecture, with no audience participa­
tion at all. Seminars have come into vogue as a method
of teaching those who stay on to do graduate work; they
are not commonly held for undergraduates. We attach
great importance to the undergraduate's own reading for
his tutorial essay. The number of hours of formal instruc­
tion which he is expected to attend is rarely more than
eight a week. The number which he actually attends is
of course much smaller. Lectures are truly voluntary.
I have not found it at all easy this year to make the
transition from teaching single students in tutorials to
teaching up to 140 students in a case class. I have enjoyed
teaching by this method, partly because of the many
utterly unexpected things which have happened to me in
classrooms here. I have also been impressed by the ability
which it develops in students to analyze cases, and by the
skill which it fosters in oral discussion. In these important
! We hope soon to rival it in Oxford. where a new Law library, built
with the aid of a very generous grant from the Rockefeller Foundation,
was opened in October, 1964.
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respects, the case class method is, I think, clearly superior
to our tutorial method. On the other hand, I have some
doubts or worries about the case method, which may
simply reflect my own shortcomings in a strange
medium.
First, I have missed the close relationship between
pupil and tutor which develops under the Oxford system
and which is, I think, a great help in teaching. When the
pupil is cleverer than the tutor, this relationship is also
very valuable to the tutor.
Secondly, I have found the case method slow, at any
rate with large classes. That is, I have consistently failed
to cover in class as much material as I had hoped to cover.
Perhaps I was too optimistic; perhaps "covering ground"
is not very important. All the same, I was worried by this
feature of the case method.
Thirdly, I was worried by the fragmentary nature of
the case method. The materials which an Oxford student
is told to read will usually give him some initial frame­
work for his essay topic. If he is a good student he will
probably modify or abandon this framework in the light
of his reading of cases and articles; but it does give him
some help in organizing his ideas. It seems to me that the
American law student is given much less help of this
kind. Of course this has the merit of forcing him to be
more creative and independent. My only doubt is
whether the challenge which he is in this way made to
face is not too severe for the majority of students; or, to
put the matter in a slightly different way, whether the
majority would not profit by being guided by their books
a little more. I am thinking now of the average, not of
the best, students.
My fourth doubt is whether the case method sufficient­
ly develops the student's ability to write. I rather think
that it does not. My impression is that the students here
are on the whole better than Oxford students in oral dis­
cussion, but worse on paper. I wonder, in this connection,
whether it would be a good thing to extend the tutorial
program here in some form into the second and third
years. I know that second and third year students write
occasional seminar papers, moot court briefs and even
notes for the Law Review. But I doubt whether these
occasional exercises are any real substitute for the con­
stant practice in legal writing which we in Oxford regard
as an important part of legal education.
I want to turn now to examinations. I do not want to
discuss the merits and demerits of examinations general­
ly. I only want to raise some questions about your exami­
nation system which have occurred to me as a result of
the contrast between it and our examination system at
Oxford.
I have an uneasy feeling that students here are
examined too soon, too often and too much. Is it, I won­
der, right to examine them in a subject less than a week
after their last class in it? Is it necessary to examine them
at the end of every quarter? Is it necessary to make them
write about thirty examinations in three years? I am not
asking these questions out of concern for the comfort of
the students. I am asking them because I feel that the
examination system here may have some undesirable
effects. Two points, above all, disturb me.
The first is that a student's final standing in his class
will be affected, perhaps adversely, by the result of exami­
nations taken at the end of his very first quarter . We may
assume that his capacity as a lawyer increases during his
three years here. Should he not be graded on the basis of
his capacity at the end of his course? What is the case for
averaging out his performance over three years? If we
must average, must we do so over the whole period?
Could first year grades at least be left out of account in
determining final standing, and be used for qualification
purposes only? Many students find it hard to settle down
to law in their first year but later do good work in the
subject. Are not such students unfairly prejudiced by the
system of averaging over three years?
The second thing that disturbs me is that the examina­
tion system here does not seem to give the student
enough time to reflect on what he has learned. In Ox­
ford a law student normally takes a qualifying examina­
tion after two terms; at the end of another seven terms
he is examined on the whole main part of his course. The
last of those seven terms is in most colleges set aside for
a review of the whole course. No new subject is taught
during it. I found this review period the most illuminat­
ing part of my time as an undergraduate. I began to see
new relationships and to learn to profit from my own
mistakes. I think that many other Oxford students have
similar experiences. Of course it will be said that students
who can look forward to such a long review period will
work less hard than those who are under constant pres­
sure of examinations. This is probably true. But there
may be more important educational considerations at
stake here than the need to keep students working at full
pressure all the time.
I am afraid that these comments on your examination
system may have distorted the perspective of this talk. In
case they have done so, let me end as I began by saying
how much I like and admire this Law School. I like it
for its friendliness and informality. I admire it for its
exciting intellectual atmosphere. That is the only really
important thing I have to say.
New Fellowship Program
A new program of fellowships in international trade and
development was inaugurated at the Law School at the
beginning of the current academic year.
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Professor Kenneth W. Dam, who administers the pro­
gram, said: "The fellowships are being offered in an at­
tempt to bring the techniques and skills of legal analysis
to the pressing problems of international trade and eco­
nomic development. This is the first time that any law
school has created a research and training project direct­
ly for this purpose."
The Fellows begin this year of work by taking part in
a joint seminar with members of the Faculty; the semi­
nar surveys current issues in international trade and de­
velopment. Fellows then devote themselves to individual
research projects, under the supervision of members of
the Faculty.
George B. Javaras and Michael G. Wolfson, both
JD'64, are the Fellows during the current year. The fel­
lowships are open to graduates of any law school in the
world. The fellowship stipend is $6,000 plus tuition and
fees. Applications are now being accepted for the aca­
demic year 1965-66.
Faculty Notes
PROFESSOR GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.; has been appointed
Administrator of the American Bar Foundation. Since it
was established in 1952 by the American Bar Association,
the Foundation has become the nation's largest legal re­
search organization, with a staff of around 45 persons
and an annual budget of approximately $500,000. The
Foundation, which is housed in the American Bar Cen­
ter across the street from the Law School, is supported
in part by sources within the profession, principally the
American Bar Association, the American Bar Association
Endowment, and the Fellows of the American Bar
Foundation, and in part through grants for specific
projects from foundations and governmental agencies.
Professor Hazard will continue to be a regular member
of the Faculty, and will divide his time between the
Foundation and the School.
PROFESSOR NORVAL R. MORRIS was a leading participant
in a special program on the theme of "Modern Advances
in Criminology" offered in December by the Center of
Criminology of the University of Toronto. Professor
Morris's public lecture, "The Past and Future of Im­
prisonment," was one of four featured lectures. In addi­
tion, he conducted a seminar, jointly with T. S. Lodge,
Director of the Home Office Research Unit, London, on
"Theories of Punishment."
We are pleased to note, even though very belatedly,
that PROFESSOR SOIA MENTSCHIKOFF was one of two law
professors in the six-person American delegation to the
Conference on International Sales Law, held at The
Hague last spring.
The Law Student and Legal Aid
By JOHN WEINBERG
Class of 1965
President, Legal Aid Student Association
In the Law School's Legal Aid Clinic program, law stu­
dents get a chance to try their wings as lawyers, and at
the same time make a vital contribution to the commu­
nity. Working under the close supervision of full-time
attorneys, students hear the legal problems of residents
of Chicago's South Side who cannot afford to 'hire an
attorney, and advise the clients of their legal rights and
best courses of action.
The first contact the student has with the work of the
Clinic comes as somewhat of a jolt to him. Many of the
problems presented by the clients are ones which he has
seldom if ever met in the course of his classroom studies
or in his personal life. The client may have purchased
an automobile or furniture on an installment contract
with terms so stiff he has not been able to comply with
them. It may be the law student's job to work out with
the client and his creditor a new payment plan satisfac­
tory to both; occasionally such a problem has ripened to
the point that, by the time the client comes into the
Clinic, all the lawyer can do for him is to explain how
the creditor can take the car away and get a huge judg­
ment against him besides. Often, a client will present a
story of marital discord and misbehavior which will
make the student's hair stand on end. He must determine
whether the story offers the elements of a case for di­
vorce or for separate maintenance. Trouble with land­
lords also comprises a sizeable portion of the work of
the Clinic. The client's landlord may have instituted an
action to evict him; or a prior landlord may be holding
some of the client's property as "security" for rent never
paid. In these cases, the student must combine a careful
reading of the lease, if any, with reference to relevant
statutes to give the client an accurate picture of his legal
position.
These are just prominent examples drawn from the
wide range of problems handled by the Clinic. Although
legal assistance in criminal cases is left to other agencies,
almost all conceivable other kinds of problems are en­
countered in the Clinic.
STUDENTS' FUNCTION
The prime task of the students working in the Clinic
is that of interviewing. Each participating student is
scheduled for certain hours of work in the Clinic each
week, and interviews the clients who come in during his
hours. The student's first visits to the Clinic are spent
sitting in as a "silent partner" on interviews by the full­
time attorneys. After the client leaves, the attorney and
the student discuss the problem and the alternative
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courses of action. In "off-moments," the student acquaints
himself with the more bureaucratic aspects of the Clinic's
procedure by reading the manual provided for that
purpose.
When the student feels that he is ready, he begins
interviewing clients on his own. He must understand
and be able to operate under the procedural system of
the Clinic. But more important, he must by then have
enough of a grasp of the substantive problems which
are most often presented to be able to ask the right
questions, and to be able to restrict the interview to the
relevant scope of inquiry. This restriction not only pro­
motes the efficient use of his time, but also provides for
the maximum preservation of the privacy of the client's
affairs. In beginning to interview on his own, the stu­
dent need not wait until such time that he is confident
he knows the best course of action in all or even most
of the situations he will meet. Indeed, it would be pre­
sumptuous of a second- or third-year law student to think
that he has the knowledge of the law and of its artful use
which is required for successfully handling cases in the
Clinic. Such knowledge and understanding are picked
up by the student as he gains experience in his Clinic
work.
The interview procedure permits the student to con­
tribute without hindrance that which he is qualified to
do, and yet guarantee a safeguard on his work. Students
talk to clients in their own special offices within the
Clinic. After determining that the client is financially
eligible for the services of Legal Aid, the student and
client discuss the legal problems which brought him to
the office. When the student thinks he has elicited all the
information relevant to the disposition of the case he
excuses himself from his office and, while the client waits,
talks with one of the full-time attorneys. Together, the
lawyer and the student discuss the client's problem, the
law in the area, and the best course of action. After the
matter has been thoroughly explored and discussed, the
student returns to his client and makes the suggestions
which he and the attorney have worked out.
DISPOSITION OF CASES
Often the result will be a referral of the matter to some
other agency. This can occur when, for example, the
client is financially able to hire an attorney; if the client
doesn't know a lawyer, it is suggested that he take ad­
vantage of the Lawyer Reference Plan of the Chicago
Bar Association. Many family cases, such as divorces, are
referred to the Social Service division of the Legal Aid
Bureau to explore further the facts of the situation and
to determine the best solution. A social worker of that
agency maintains an office right in the Clinic. Once
cleared there, the case returns to the Legal Aid Bureau
for the required legal action. In support cases, clients are
directed to the Court of Domestic Relations.
Some wage claim cases are turned over to the Illinois
Department of Labor, which will furnish assistance to
the client. But in many cases, the student can advise the
client as to the best course of action. This may consist of
simply explaining in detail to the client his legal rights
in the situation, thus enabling him to insist on that to
which he is entitled in settling the matter himself. Some­
times the student is called upon to write a letter or make
a call in the client's behalf. If the case is to go to court,
the student may assist in the preparation of court papers.
The dispositions are as varied as the number of problems
presented.
STRUCTURE AND HISTORY OF THE CLINIC
The Legal Aid Clinic serves only the residents of a
specified portion of Chicago's South Side. It operates as
a branch office of the Legal Aid Bureau, which serves the
entire city, and has its main office downtown. The Clinic
was established under a grant from Edwin F. Mandel in
1957, and had its original offices on 63rd St. When the
new law school building opened in 1959, space was pro­
vided under the classroom wing for a suite of offices for
the Clinic.
The administrative structure of the Clinic reflects its
hybrid nature. It is basically a branch office of the down­
town Bureau. The attorneys and other paid staff are
employed by that agency, but the Director of the Clinic
is also a member of the faculty of the Law School. Gen­
eral supervision of the Clinic and the students' work in
it is the function of a faculty committee, formerly under
the chairmanship of Professor Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
and currently of Professor Dallin H. Oaks.
As of November 1, thirty-eight students were partici­
pating on a regularly scheduled basis. The Legal Aid
Student Association is made up of all the students par­
ticipating in the Clinic. Through its officers, it serves the
functions of stimulating student participation, 'publiciz­
ing the work of the Clinic, scheduling the students work­
ing there, providing liaison between the Law School and
the work of the Clinic, etc. The Edwin F. Mandel Prize
is awarded each year to the graduating third-year student
who performed outstanding service in and for the Clinic;
and regular participants receive certificates upon their
graduation.
The Director of the Clinic is Mr. Henry J. Kaganiec;
he and Mrs. Mary Smithburg are the Clinic's two full­
time attorneys. Mr. Kaganiec, after extensive legal edu­
cation on the Continent and a J.D. degree at Northwest­
ern, was selected for the position of Director by commit­
tees from the Law School and from the Legal Aid Bureau
at the inception of the Clinic in 1957. He has served in
this capacity throughout the Clinic's seven year existence.
Other Legal Aid Clinics are in operation throughout
the country. There are clinics affiliated with Harvard and
Duke University Law Schools, for example; and North-
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western students participate in the work of the Legal Aid
Bureau's downtown office. The Edwin F. Mandel Clinic
however, is the largest Clinic in the country, measured
by the number of cases handled.
VALUE OF PARTICIPATION
The b�nefits to the law student participating in the
Legal AId program derive only in small part from the
know�edg� of the substantive law involved in solvingthe clients problems. Of much greater importance is the
realization that legal problems are people's problems.
The Cli.nic helps to put legal questions in the proper
perspective for a neophyte practicing lawyer: not as ab­
stract theoretical problems, as one finds on an examina­
tion, in a law review article, or in an appellate case, but
as disruptive factors in people's lives. The work of a
lawyer is dearly seen not to be that of an impartial bal­
ancing of issues and theoretical propositions; he is a
member of the community who has special skills and
tr.ainin� and to whom people turn for help with these
disruptive problems. In this sense, the program of the
Clinic serves as a vital supplement to the more conven­
tional aspects of law school work.
Another benefit derived by the student is the develop­
ment of the skills of dealing with people and helping
them solve their own problems. Facing a client in your
o,,:n office is an awkward and sometimes a frightening
thing to a young lawyer or law student. Talking the
problem out with the client, and padding the legal ad­
vice given with the interest and understanding necessary
for satisfying a client, are skills which must be learned
through experience by every lawyer. Those who have
had experience in this direction in law school are that
much ahead when they enter practice.
Underlying all these activities, however, is the motif of
excitement in the Clinic's work. A participant is almost
always enthusiastic about his experience. It is gratifying
to him to realize that people are coming to seek his help,
and that he has real help to offer them. One is much
closer to conditions in the community, and has a much
clearer grasp of the problems of the poor in an urban
area.
In this summary of benefits from the Legal Aid pro­
gram, one must not slight the community contribution
made by students giving their time and efforts to the
work of the Clinic. To be sure, it is unusual to find a
program which offers simultaneously so many personal
benefits to the participant and such a significant com­
munity service.
But providing legal assistance to the poor is more than
j�st a community service. It is increasingly being recog­
nized as a duty of the profession and, as the decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright would indicate, of the society as
a whole. The Honorable Robert F. Kennedy, then Attor­
ney General of the United States and now Senator-elect
from New York, put it thus in his Law Day address at
the Law School on May 1, 1964:
" It is time we used those traditional skills-our precision, our
�nders.tanding of technicalities, our adversary skills, our negotiat­
mg skills, our understanding of procedural maneuvers-on behalf
of the poor.
.
Only when we have dane all these things, when we have created
I� fac� a system of .eq�al justice for all-a system which recog­
�Izes m fact the dignity of all
men-will our profession have
lived up to its responsibilities.
And Now, for a Word from ...
When the Weymouth Kirkland Courtroom was de­
signed, large windows were placed between the Court­
room and the adjoining lounges with the thought that,
in addition to the other purposes they serve, they might
be useful for television cameras. They are.
During the autumn, a considerable segment of NBC­
TV's "Today" show was filmed at the Law School. The
portion of the program dealing with the School itself
consisted of an interview of Dean Neal by Hugh Downs,
and a broadcast of a substantial segment of a moot court
argument from the Kirkland Courtroom. Counsel shown
arguing were Patrick Hardin, A.B., University of Ala­
bama, of Childersburg, Alabama, and Thomas West,
B.B.A., Northwestern University, of Galesburg, Illinois,
both of the Class of 1965. Hardin and West, together
with K.enneth L. Pursley, A.B., Cornell University, of
Sandpoint, Idaho, make up the School's national moot
court team.
On the Bench were Professors Soia Mentschikoff, pre­
siding, Sheldon Tefft, and Dallin H. Oaks.
Later in the day, the Law Buildings were used as a
setting for interviews with Samuel K. Allison, Professor
of Physics and Director of the Enrico Fermi Institute,
and with Charles H. Percy, then candidate for Governor
of Illinois.
As a f�atur� of the "Today" show, Charles Percy, Trustee of
the University and then candidate for Governor of Illinois is
interviewed in the Law Quadrangle.
'
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The Hinton Competition argument seen by viewers of the "Today" show. On the bench are Professors Dallin H. Oaks, JD'57, Soia Merit­
schikoff and Sheldon Tefft. Patrick Hardin, Class of 1965, is addressing the Court. Thomas West, also Class of 1965, was the other partici­
pant in the televised argument.
Television cameras over Loch Levi A group of law students with Jack Lescoulie, of the "Today" show.
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Dean Neal with Hugh Downs, during the filming of the "Today"
show.
Professor Dallin H. Oaks, Professor Soia Mentschikoff, and James
Parker Hall Professor Sheldon Tefft on the bench in the Kirkland
Courtroom during the filming of a segment of the "Today" show.
Mr. Percy chats with law students John Polk and John Weinberg.
Dean Neal is interviewed by Hugh Downs of the "Today" show
in the Weymouth Kirkland Courtroom.
Placement Report
The Class of 1964
Graduates of the Law School continue to make widely
varied choices, both as to the kinds of jobs they prefer
and the parts of the country to which they go. The pat­
tern for the class graduated last June was as follows:
Private Practice with Law Firms (19 in Chicago; 9 in New
York; 3 in Denver; 2 in Boston; 1 each in Columbus, Ohio;
Portland, Oregon; Hammond, Indiana; Rochester, New York;
Washington, D.C.; Syracuse; Detroit; Hartford; Twin Falls,
Idaho; San Francisco; Minneapolis; Evanston, Illinois; Flint,
Michigan; Salt Lake City; LaCrosse, Wisconsin; Cincinnati;
Los Angeles; and Seattle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Graduate Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Law Clerks to Judges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Teaching and Research. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Corporate Legal Departments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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Federal Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
State and Local Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Accounting Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Business Executive Positions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Bank Trust Departments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Military Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Unknown....... 8
The Placement Office
The number of law firms, corporate legal departments,
government agencies, and other employers which visit
the School to interview its students continues to increase.
Such visits tend to be heavily concentrated in the Au­
tumn Quarter, but occur also in the Winter and even
in the Spring; the number of such visits during the
Autumn Quarter, 1964, was the highest on record.
Since about half of the current seniors have firm com­
mitments as of this writing, placement of the Class of
1965 is proceeding at a satisfactory pace, as compared
with past performance in this Law School and current
performance at other leading institutions. It is hardly
necessary to add that no pace is "satisfactory" to a student
who has not yet made a commitment, and that this is a
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view of its placement activity in which the School ern­
phatically concurs.
Readers of the Record who may be interested in add­
ing young lawyers to their offices, or who know of other
employers with available openings, are urged to notify
the Placement Office. Interviews can be arranged at the
Law School or in the employers' offices. Because our stu­
dent body is truly national in origin (less than one-third
of this year's entering class is from Illinois) positions in
almost any part of the country are usually of interest to
some students. It should also be pointed out that a large
number of first- and second-year students are strongly
interested in summer employment, and that the School
regularly hears from recent graduates who wish to
change their associations.
Grades and Class Standings
As part of a general program for further strengthening
placement, the Law School has revised its policy with
respect to disclosure of class standing. The School is per­
suaded that under present circumstances some methods
of disclosure may, in some cases, be so misleading as to
do more harm than good. Thus, a small difference in
numerical grade average may mean a large difference in
class standing; for example, in the present senior class,
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19 students are separated by less than 1 point. Reliance on
class standing in such circumstances tends both to mag­
nify insignificant differences and to exaggerate the preci­
sion of the grading process. The resultant distortion is,
moreover, accentuated by the selectivity of our admis­
sions policy and the resultant strength of our student
body. Because of exacting admissions standards and
exacting requirements thereafter, the gap between the
lower and higher ranking, on a numerical basis, has di­
minished strikingly. Such strength in a student body
cannot, of course, be reflected in any numerical ranking
system.
In an attempt to mitigate distortions implicit in class
rankings and at the same time to supply meaningful in­
formation to prospective employers, the School has
adopted the following policy:
1. Numerical grade averages will be disclosed to students and
prospective employers. Complete transcripts of students' course
grades will also be made available.
2. If a student ranks in the first 40 places in his class, a specific
class ranking will appear on his transcript.
3. All prospective employers will be informed of the distribution
of members of a class with respect to their cumulative averages.
For example, in the current senior class, that distribution IS as
follows:
79 and above - 2
78 to 78.99 - 4
77 to 77.99 - 4
76 to 76.99 - 11
75 to 75.99 - 11
74 to 74.99 - 19
71 to 73.99 - 52
69 to 70.99 - 22
68 to 68.99 - 0
A minimum average of 68 is required for a student to remain
in good standing.
4. With respect to the general quality of the student body,
the performance of the Law School's students on the Law School
Admission Test, as compared to the national norms, is an eloquent
piece of evidence. (The School fully realizes that the LSAT score
is only one significant element of many. It does provide, however,
a significant and manageable standard of comparison with law
students generally. Other major indices, such as undergraduate
academic records, tend to provide strong corroboration.)
National Norm, LSAT-Median Scare is the 50th percentile
Current Third-Year Class, The University of Chicago Law
School-Median Score is slightly above the 90th percentile
Current Second-Year Class-Median Score is slightly above the
92nd percentile
Current First-Year Class-Median Score is at the. 95th per­
centile
The graph adjoining, which is provided to all stu­
dents and all prospective employers, vividly underscores
the above information.
The opening session of the School's Seventeenth Annual Federal Tax Conference
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The Conference and Lecture Program:
Ethics, Taxes, Slums, and Other
Considerations
For some years it has been the School's agreeable custom
to hold a dinner, followed by a lecture by a distinguished
lawyer or judge, for members of the entering class. The
lecture and dinner take place during the opening week
of the academic year. Members of the Board of Direc­
tors of the Law Alumni Association and of the Law
School Visiting Committee are honored guests.
Last October, members of the Class of 1967 heard the
Honorable Henry J. Friendly, Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Judge Friend­
ly's talk, "On Entering the Pathway of the Law" appears
in its entirety in this issue of the Record.
In October also, the Ninth Ernst Freund Lecture was
delivered by the Right Honorable Lord Devlin, P.C.,
Chairman of the British Press Council and formerly
Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. The Lectureship, named in
honor of the distinguished member of the Law Faculty
who is saluted at length by Professor Allen elsewhere in
this issue, has been held in the past by the Honorable
Felix Frankfurter, Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Honorable Walter V. Schaefer, Justice of the Illinois Su­
preme Court, the Honorable Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr.,
Judge of the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts, The
Right Honorable Lord Denning of Whitchurch, Lord
of Appeal in Ordinary, the Right Honorable Lord Park­
er of Waddington, Lord Chief Justice of England, Wil­
ber G. Katz, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin,
the Honorable John Marshall Harlan, Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, and the Right Honorable Sir Kenneth
Diplock, Lord Justice of the Court of Appeal. Lord Dev­
lin's Freund Lecture, "Liberty in Morality," will appear
in the forthcoming issue of The University of Chicago
Law Review.
Later in the Autumn Quarter, the Law School spon­
sored a Conference on Judicial Ethics. The Honorable
John S. Hastings, Chief Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, presented the principal
paper of the opening session, on the subject of "Partici­
pation in Money-Making Activities." Commenting on
the paper were the Honorable Thomas E. Fairchild,
Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and Robert
L. Stern, of Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess, Tierney, Brown
and Platt, Chicago. The second session heard a paper by
Simon H. Rifkind, of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
and Garrison, New York, and formerly a U.S. District
Court Judge, on "The Public Concern in a Judge's
Private Life." Comment was offered by Edward L.
Wright, of Wright, Lindsey, Jennings, Lester and
Shultz, Little Rock, Arkansas, formerly Chairman of the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association,
The central paper of the third session was "The Problem
of Sanctions against Judges," by the Honorable Absalom
F. Bray, Presiding Justice, District Court of Appeals of
California. Commentators were James Halpin, of Kissam
and Halpin, New York, and R. Newton Rooks, of
Stevenson, Conaghan, Hackbert, Rooks and Pitts, Chi­
cago, past president of the Chicago Bar Association. The
Honorable Charles D. Breitel, Justice of the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court, delivered the
final paper of the Conference; his subject was, "Ethical
Problems in the Performance of the Judicial Function.;'
Presiding over the Conference sessions were Professor
Stanley A. Kaplan, Professor Soia Mentschikoff, Profes­
sor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and Dean Phil C. Neal.
The Law School's Seventeenth Annual Federal Tax
Conference was held during the last week in October,
The three-day Conference, the program of which is too
long to be reproduced here, drew more than SOO lawyers,
accountants and corporate tax executives from 23 states.
Chairman 'Of the Conference Planning Committee was
Michael J. Sporrer, of Arthur Andersen and Company;
the School's representatives on the Planning Committee
are Professor Walter J. Blum and Assistant Dean James
M. Ratcliffe. Papers delivered at the Conference have
been published; alumni of the School should by nDW
have received a copy.
Two additional Conferences are scheduled for the
Spring Quarter, the Conference on the Good Samaritan,
on April 9, and the Conference on Slums and the Law,
on May 7.
The Honorable Henry J. Friendly, Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, member of the Visiting Com­
mittee, and speaker of the evening, at dinner with entering
students.
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At the Conference on Judicial Ethics, left to right, the Honorable
Benjamin Landis, Judge, Superior Court of Los Angeles, Profes­
sor Soia Mentschikoff, who presided at the Conference, and the
Honorable Charles Breitel, Judge of the Appellate Division, New
York Supreme Court, and Conference speaker.
Justice Breitel responds to a question during a discussion period
of the Conference on Judicial Ethics.
Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, The University of Chicago Law
School, opening the third session of the Conference on Judicial
Ethics. On the platform, the session speakers, left to right, R. New­
ton Rooks, Esq., of Stevenson, Conaghan, Hackbert, Rooks and
Pitts, Chicago; James Halpin, Esq., of Kissam and Halpin, New
York, and the Honorable Absalom F. Bray, Presiding Justice, Dis­
trict Court of Appeals of California:
At a break during the Conference, left to right, the Honorable
John S. Hastings, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit; Robert L. Stern, Esq., of Mayer, Friedlich,
Spiess, Tierney, Brown and Platt, Chicago; Law School Assistant
Dean James M. Ratcliffe, JD'50, and Professor Stanley Kaplan,
JD'33.
Judge Hastings and Mr. Stern flank the Honorable Thomas E.
Fairchild, Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, between
sessions at the Judicial Ethics Conference.
Also at the Conference: Simon H. Rifkind, Esq., of Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison, New York, formerly a U.S. Dis­
trict Judge; Professor Mentschikoff, and Edward L. Wright, Esq.,
of Wright, Lindsey, Jennings, Lester and Shults, Little Rock,
immediate past Chairman of the House of Delegates, American
Bar Association.
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Lord Devlin with the Honorable Walter V. Schaefer, JD'28, Justice
of the Illinois Supreme Court and Chairman of the Law School
Visiting Committee, and the Honorable Jacob M. Braude, JD'20,
Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County and Director of the
Law Alumni Association.
Harry N. Wyatt, JD'21, Member of the Visiting Committee and
of the Alumni Board, greets an entering student.
A view of the dinner welcoming the Class of 1967 to the Law
School.
Lord Devlin with Kenneth Culp Davis, John P. Wilson Professor
of Law, and Mrs. Davis.
The Right Honorable Lord Devlin begins the Ninth Ernst Freund
Lecture.
Professor Norval R. Morris, Mrs. Morris, and three first-year
students view the School with wild surmise as their careers there
begin.
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George B. Pidot, JD'30, of New York, Mrs. Arnold I. Shure, and
Arnold I. Shure, JD'29, at the reception honoring Lord Devlin.
Messrs. Pidot and Shure are Directors of the Law Alumni As­
sociation.
The Honorable Sheldon Cohen, then Chief Counsel of the Internal
Revenue Service and now Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
delivers the opening address at the Seventeenth Annual Federal
Tax Conference.
Thomas L. Nicholson, JD'55, of the Law Alumni Board, meets a
group of first-year students.
The University Honors Law Alumni
Each Spring, the general Alumni Association of the Uni­
versity of Chicago awards to selected graduates of the
University their Alumni Citation of Useful Citizen, rec­
ognizing "leadership in those civic, social and religious
activities that are essential to democracy." Of twenty-two
so honored in 1964, six were Law School alumni. The
University Alumni Association described their accom­
plishments as follows:
JUDGE RICHARD B. AUSTIN, Chicago, JD'26, has been a
Judge of the United States District Court for the North­
ern District of Illinois since 1961. He is a trustee of
Denison University in Ohio and a vestryman of the
Church of St. John the Evangelist in Flossmoor. He
serves on the boards of the Flossmoor Recreation Asso­
ciation and the Olympia Fields Country Club. Before
his appointment to the federal bench, Judge Austin was
a Superior Court Judge in Cook County; twice served
as Chief Justice of the Criminal Court; and twice served
as first Assistant State's Attorney of Cook County.
LEO J. CARLIN, Chicago, JD'19, is a senior partner in
the law firm of Sonnenschein, Levinson, Carlin, Nath
and Rosenthal. He is a trustee of the Chicago Medical
School, the Francis W. Parker School, the Anshe Emet
Synagogue, and the Retina Foundation of Boston. He
has led fund-raising efforts on behalf of the Jewish Fed­
eration of Metropolitan Chicago, the Combined Jewish
Appeal, and other causes. He has served on the boards
of the Citizens of Greater Chicago and The University
of Chicago Law School Alumni Association.
ALBERT J. MESEROW, Chicago, JD'30, is chairman of
the Great Lakes Commission, an inter-state statutory
agency whose members are appointed by the governors
of eight interested states. He has also served as the first
chairman of the Joint Civic Committee on Elections,
which represents 57 civic organizations, and has been
active on numerous committees of the Illinois and Chi­
cago bars.
CHARLES STRULL, Louisville, JD'lO, was the founder,
and later president, of the Legal Aid Society of Louis­
ville. Strull was a charter member of the Conference of
Jewish Organizations, which acts as the central planning
body of the Louisville Jewish community. In 1934, he
founded the Kentucky Committee for Service to New
Americans, which helped refugees from Hitler's Ger­
many and continues to serve new immigrants. He was a
founder and is a past president of the Louisville Com­
mittee for the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a
founder and president of the Louisville Astronomical
Society, and a founder of the Beckham Bird Club in
Louisville.
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JAMES H. EVANS, New York, JD'48, is chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the National Recreation Association,
which services both public and private affiliated agencies
in 1,480 communities throughout the United States with
publications, field services conferences, and experimental
recreation programs. Evans' work in the Association
dates from his Chicago days, when he was a member of
its special lay committee to develop an experimental rec­
reation program for the home-bound.
Since moving to New York in 1957, Evans has been a
trustee of the Midtown Hospital, member of the Boy
Scout Metropolitan Council, chairman of the major gifts
division of the city Red Cross appeal, and treasurer of
the Bronxville Community Fund.
Evans is an elder and executive committee member in
the Dutch Reformed Church of Bronxville. A native of
Kentucky, Evans continues to serve there as a trustee of
Centre College, his undergraduate alma mater. He is
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vice-president for finance and a director of Dun & Brad­
street, Inc.
ALEX L. HILLMAN, New York, '24, founder and presi­
dent of Hillman Periodicals, book publisher and philan­
thropist, art collector and connoisseur, recipient of the
Freedoms Foundation award in 1950, and long-time
friend of The University of Chicago.
A member of the International Council of the Museum
of Modern Art in New York, Hillman has made distinc­
tive gifts to several institutions. Notable among these is
the Antoine Pevsner sculpture to The University of
Chicago Law School. Hillman was a special consultant
to the Senate Appropriations Committee and the State
Department for several years following World War II.
He was a trustee of Pacific University in Stockton, Cali­
fornia, and is a member of the Endowment and Public
Fund Committee for the Lahey Clinic in Boston.
